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ALTERNATIVE COURTS
AND DRUG TREATMENT:
FINDING A REHABILITATIVE SOLUTION
FOR ADDICTS IN A RETRIBUTIVE SYSTEM
Molly K. Webster*
Sentencing drug crimes and treating drug-addicted defendants often stem
from contradictory theories of punishment. In the late twentieth century,
courts traded rehabilitation for retributive ideals to fight the “War on
Drugs.” However, beginning with the Miami-Dade Drug Court, treatment
and rehabilitation have returned to the forefront of sentencing policy in
traditional and alternative drug courts.
Jurisdictions have implemented a variety of policies designed to treat
addiction as opposed to punishing it. Community courts, such as the Red
Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New York, community-panel
drug courts, such as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court in Iowa,
and Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement represent efforts to
address treatment within the court system. This Note argues that certain
policies are more likely to benefit drug-addicted defendants than others,
including procedural justice, predictable sanctions, and an increased focus
on treatment. It also posits that qualitative studies measuring long-term
success of drug treatment programs should be commissioned to ensure that
drug courts utilize the most effective treatment policies that promote
rehabilitative ideals.
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-six years ago, the first drug court opened its doors in MiamiDade County, Florida.1 Traditional drug courts2 were founded as a reaction
to retributive sanctions used to fight the “War on Drugs”3 and to relieve
overburdened criminal courts with high drug-related caseloads.4 Drug
courts have received praise because they shift the focus of criminal
sanctions for drug-addicted defendants from punitive to rehabilitative.5
Subsequent to the founding of drug courts, legislatures and judges across
the country have created alternatives to the traditional drug court model.6
These alternatives include community-based approaches,7 swift sanction
probation programs,8 and a mix of the two. These programs have aimed to
correct perceived problems9 with traditional drug courts. In doing so,
alternative policies have shifted the way the justice system views, treats,
and sentences addicts.
Drug courts and community programs aim to divert alcoholics and
addicts to an alternative system through which they receive treatment and
learn how to sustain their sobriety after their interactions with the courts
end.10 While these programs stress the participant’s rehabilitation,11 their
1. See Drug Court History, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS.,
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited Oct. 21,
2015) [http://perma.cc/NZ4Q-BM37].
2. This Note distinguishes between “traditional” drug courts, such as the Miami-Dade
Drug Court, discussed infra Part I.C–D, and “alternative” drug courts, such as community
courts, community-panel drug courts, and swift-sanction programs, which are the subject of
this Note and are discussed infra Parts II–IV.
3. President Richard Nixon first called for “an effective war” to counteract the
“national and international” drug problem in an address to Congress in 1971. President
Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
(June 17, 1971), 1971 PUB. PAPERS 739. Despite this rhetoric, it should be noted that
President Nixon advocated rehabilitative ideals to address the drug problem. See id. at 743–
45 (proposing an allocation of funds “solely for the treatment and rehabilitation of drugaddicted individuals”).
4. See Sheila M. Murphy, Drug Courts: An Effective, Efficient Weapon in the War on
Drugs, 85 ILL. B.J. 474, 475 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug
Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to
Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 462–68 (1999).
6. See, e.g., Dwight Vick & Jennifer Lamb Keating, Community-Based Drug Courts:
Empirical Success. Will South Dakota Follow Suit?, 52 S.D. L. REV. 288, 296 (2007)
(discussing the evolution of drug courts to include community-panel courts).
7. For example, the Red Hook Community Justice Center, see infra Part II.A, and the
Woodbury County Community Drug Court, see infra Part II.B.
8. For example, Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) and
Washington Intensive Supervision Program (WISP) in Hawaii and Washington, respectively.
See infra Part II.C.
9. As discussed infra Part I.D.5, traditional drug courts have had difficulty defining the
role of the public defender and finding an appropriate medium between punishing drug
crimes and administering treatment.
10. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 476–77.
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success is largely measured by quantitative statistics: How many of the
participants have graduated12 and have the programs reduced recidivism
While these measurements are important, the underlying
rates?13
sentencing theory—rehabilitation—requires a more nuanced approach to
the analysis of the programs. Treatment programs’ effectiveness must also
focus on the individual and how she is rehabilitated through the process,
both in the short and long term.
This Note discusses the policy implications and effectiveness of
alternative drug courts. Part I provides a brief history of the legal policy of
treating addicts and the founding of state and federal drug courts.14 Part II
outlines three alternative drug court models: (i) community courts that use
a holistic approach to sentencing and treatment, such as the Red Hook
Community Justice Center;15 (ii) community-panel courts that use
community volunteers, such as the Woodbury County Community Drug
Court;16 and (iii) swift and certain sanction programs, such as Hawaii’s
Opportunity Probation with Enforcement17 (HOPE). Part III examines the
success of these programs both quantitatively, analyzing recidivism rates
and graduation from the programs, and qualitatively, focusing on the
programs’ effects on individual participants.18
Finally, Part IV highlights elements of each program that will ensure
addicts receive appropriate treatment.19 It argues that, to further these
goals, it is necessary to maintain holistic approaches to sentencing, an
informal courtroom, and clear and consistent sanctions for program
violations. Additionally, research must be conducted that measures
qualitative data on a long-term basis to ensure that the rehabilitative policies
have a lasting effect on participants’ recoveries. These suggested changes,
if implemented, would ensure that drug-addicted defendants receive the
tools necessary to be rehabilitated.

11. See id. at 477.
12. See, e.g., WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST.,
PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (2011), http://www.ndci.org/
sites/default/files/nadcp/PCP%20Report%20FINAL.PDF [http://perma.cc/UJ47-U3EW].
13. See, e.g., MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK
STATE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS AND IMPACTS 83–113
(2003),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/whatsnew/pdf/NYSAdultDrugCourtEvaluation.pdf
(measuring drug courts’ success using rates of recidivism) [http://perma.cc/75YN-HMWF].
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE POLICY AND PRACTICE
OF TREATING ADDICTS
Statutes criminalizing drug use have existed throughout the twentieth
century.20 However, the 1960s and 1970s saw a cultural shift: drug use
and drug-related arrests increased dramatically.21 This “drug revolution”22
led to federal legislation such as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 197023 and the Rockefeller Drug Laws in
1973.24 While lawmakers had previously used rehabilitation theory in
formulating sentencing regimes,25 the “War on Drugs” led to a shift in
sentencing policy in the United States26—and with it, a changing view of
the addict as criminal.27
This part examines the history of drug crimes and courts as they relate to
the theories of punishment. First, this part reviews the four theories of
punishment—rehabilitation, deterrence, retributivism, and incapacitation—
as they relate to the definition of addiction. Second, this part tracks the
criminal justice system’s struggle with understanding addiction in legal
terms. Subsequently, this part discusses the formation and structure of the
first drug courts. Finally, this part explores the basic model for traditional
drug courts, the common eligibility requirements, and the structure of the
treatment programs as a means for comparison with the alternative
treatment programs that are the subject of this Note.

20. For example, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 criminalized the manufacture, sale,
and possession of opiates, cocaine, and the nonmedical use of marijuana. See Pub. L. No. 75238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).
21. See DUANE C. MCBRIDE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE DRUGS-CRIME WARS:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN THEORY, POLICY, AND PROGRAM INTERVENTIONS
99 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194616d.pdf [http://perma.cc/8PW6-6PKF].
22. See id.
23. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
24. The Rockefeller Drug Laws, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00–.65 (McKinney 2013),
imposed mandatory minimum prison sentences for drug-related crimes and were often
criticized, even by New York State judges. See People v. Stephens, 431 N.E.2d 972, 973
(1981) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (referring to the Rockefeller Drug Laws as “draconian”
and “inexorable”).
25. See Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation:
Policy, Practice, and Prospects, 3 POLICIES, PROCESSES & DECISIONS CRIM. JUST. SYS. 109,
111 (2000) (“Since virtually the inception of the modern criminal justice system, a persistent
response to the question of what to do with lawbreakers has been to change them into lawabiders—that is, to rehabilitate them.”); infra Part I.A.
26. See Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST.
299, 314 (2013) (noting that “[b]y the mid-1970s’ [sic], it had become common to ask, ‘Is
rehabilitation dead?’”).
27. As some critics note, with his “War on Drugs” campaign, President Nixon
“transformed the public image of the drug user into one of a dangerous and anarchic threat to
American civilization,” stating “[i]n fact, [their] incarceration was for the nation’s own
good.” Emily Dufton, The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime,
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-waron-drugs-how-president-nixon-tied-addiction-to-crime/254319/ [http://perma.cc/A5FB-GX
6H].
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A. Rehabilitation and Drug Crimes:
The Theories of Punishment
Drug addicts present a quandary for the criminal justice system: How
should a court punish an individual for whom criminal behavior is the result
of an underlying disease?28 One of the primary tenets of drug courts is to
move away from the retributive ideals of the 1970s and 1980s29 toward a
rehabilitative goal.30
While rehabilitation has historically been a primary tenet of sentencing
policy,31 the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries mark the introduction of
another theory of punishment that focused on punishing offenders for their
wrongs—retributivism.32 These two competing theories—rehabilitation
and retributivism—were utilized in formulating modern drug crime
policy.33

28. The American Society of Addiction Medicine, a member of the American Medical
Association, defines addiction as
a primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation, memory and related
circuitry. Dysfunction in these circuits leads to characteristic biological,
psychological, social and spiritual manifestations. This is reflected in an
individual pathologically pursuing reward and/or relief by substance use and other
behaviors.
Addiction is characterized by inability to consistently abstain, impairment in
behavioral control, craving, diminished recognition of significant problems with
one’s behaviors and interpersonal relationships, and a dysfunctional emotional
response. Like other chronic diseases, addiction often involves cycles of relapse
and remission. Without treatment or engagement in recovery activities, addiction
is progressive and can result in disability or premature death.
Definition of Addiction, AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., http://www.asam.org/for-thepublic/definition-of-addiction (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/4EAS-QHYY].
One working definition of recovery is “a process of change through which an individual
achieves abstinence and improved health, wellness and quality of life.” Definition of
Recovery, NAT’L COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM & DRUG DEPENDENCE INC.,
https://ncadd.org/recovery-support/definition (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.
cc/TJ9S-YTNK].
29. See John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for
Justice Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 932 (2000); Adam Lamparello, Reaching Across Legal
Boundaries: How Mediation Can Help the Criminal Law in Adjudicating “Crimes of
Addiction”, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 335, 340 (2001) (“By the 1970s, the optimism
and idealism that characterized the reformation movement slowly began to evaporate, as
rehabilitation experienced a series of vicious criticisms, examining both its theoretical
foundations and practical efficacy.”).
30. See Martin I. Reisig, Rediscovering Rehabilitation: Drug Courts, Community
Corrections and Restorative Justice, 1998 MICH. B.J. 172, 174, http://www.reisigmediation.
com/pdf/reisit-mbj-02.1998.pdf (“The drug court movement represents a real effort at
rehabilitation and is quickly gaining in sophistication.”) [http://perma.cc/J4F9-Z3ZD].
31. See Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 25.
32. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 1:2 (West 2014). One of the
earliest examples of these theories is lex talionis, or “an eye for an eye.” See Meghan J.
Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1053–59 (2012). Retributivism in its
current form became a “legitimate, and even the primary, justification for punishment” in the
mid-1980s in the United States. See id. at 1057.
33. Compare Reisig, supra note 30, at 172–74 (noting the use of rehabilitation in the
drug court movement), with Kimberly L. Patch, The Sentencing Reform Act: Reconsidering
Rehabilitation As a Critical Consideration in Sentencing, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
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1. Utilitarian Theories
Rehabilitation is a subset of utilitarianism, a category that also includes
incapacitation and deterrence.34 Utilitarian theory posits that there is a
balance between improving and punishing the offender, thereby reducing
recidivism and protecting the public.35 The theory, advocated for by
philosopher Jeremy Bentham, aims to evaluate a course of conduct by the
“amount of happiness and suffering that is generated by the conduct.”36
The theory is forward-looking; an individual’s past criminal acts are largely
irrelevant in deciding her punishment.37
The theory of rehabilitation posits that the decision to commit a crime is
not free will, but rather is determined by various sociological,
psychological, and biological factors.38 Rehabilitation is premised on the
notion that punishment should include treatment so that the defendant is
able return to society “so reformed that he will not desire or need to commit
further crimes.”39 Drug courts rely on rehabilitation when formulating
treatment and sentencing regimes.40
In addition to rehabilitation, utilitarian theories include deterrence and
incapacitation. The goal of deterrence is to prevent crime through “actual
or threatened punishment.”41 Deterrence may be accomplished generally,
by using society’s awareness of punishment of a crime to deter others from
committing future offenses,42 and specifically, by deterring a specific
offender from reoffending.43

CONFINEMENT 165, 182 (2013) (discussing the relationship between the Sentencing Reform
Act and rehabilitation).
34. See Andrew R. Strauss, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forest for the Retributivist
Trees: An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian Model of Punishment, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2002).
35. See Paul Gendreau, Rehabilitation: What Works to Change Offenders, in
CORRECTIONAL THEORY: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 147–50 (Francis T. Cullen &
Cheryl L. Jonson eds., 2012).
36. Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism:
The Injustice of “Just”
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 856 (2002); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2 (Batoche Books,
Kitchener 2000) (1781) (ebook).
37. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 1557.
38. See David J. Rothman, Correctional Theory in Crisis: America’s Changing Context,
in CORRECTIONAL THEORY: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 35, at 23, 25; see also
Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence: Scaring Offenders Straight, in CORRECTIONAL THEORY:
CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 35, at 67, 73.
39. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIM. L. § 1.5 (2d ed. 2014).
40. See Reisig, supra note 30.
41. John C. Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 347 (1955).
42. See CAMPBELL, supra note 32, § 2:2. General deterrence can be accomplished
through “apparent punishment, even if without actual punishment.” Christopher, supra note
36, at 857.
43. Specific deterrence has received some criticism because there is little evidence of an
“effect arising from the experience of imprisonment compared with the experience of
noncustodial sanctions such as probation.” Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First
Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 200–05 (2013).
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Incapacitation theory states that the most effective way to ensure
someone does not reoffend is to incarcerate or physically isolate her.44 The
theories of incapacitation and deterrence affect the treatment of addicts in
the criminal justice system. For example, deterrence and incapacitation
have been the underlying justifications for strict sentencing regimes
implemented in connection with the War on Drugs.45 Deterrence is also
used as justification for swift sanction programs.46 For example, advocates
of HOPE theorize that the strict probation requirements and the use of swift
and immediate sanctions deter probationers from violating the terms of
probation or reoffending.47
2. Retributive Theories
The Rockefeller Drug Laws reflected another theory of punishment:
Many hypothesized that rehabilitation was not
retributivism.48
accomplishing the goals it set out to address.49 Both liberals and
conservatives blamed rehabilitation for thwarting the goals of punishment.50
Theorists and criminal justice actors began focusing their attention
elsewhere, primarily on retributivism as a means to reduce recidivism.51
The theory of retribution structures sentencing so that individuals receive
sanctions justified on the grounds that the “offenders deserve it.”52
44. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution As an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000).
45. For example, the Rockefeller Drug Laws implemented mandatory and indeterminate
prison terms based on the weight of the drug, placed restrictions on plea bargaining, and
used mandatory prison sentences for repeat offenders. See Drug Law Changes, N.Y. ST.
DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVS., http://criminaljustice.ny.gov/drug-law-reform/index.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/CDL6-PTTJ]. These laws were seen as the logical
solution to the drug epidemic. See Edward J. Maggio, New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws,
Then and Now, 78 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 30, 30 (2006) (“The idea behind the new laws was to
deter criminals and to quarantine users, so the plague of drug addiction could be
contained.”).
46. See infra Part II.C; infra note 263 and accompanying text.
47. See ANGELA HAWKEN, AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, THE MESSAGE FROM HAWAII:
HOPE FOR PROBATION 40 (2012) (citing “[a] clearly defined behavioral contract” and
“foreseeable, known consequences” as key reasons for which “the certainty of
punishment . . . deters future violations” (emphasis omitted)).
48. See Timothy Edwards, The Theory and Practice of Compulsory Drug Treatment in
the Criminal Justice System: The Wisconsin Experiment, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 283, 290
(“Anchored by retributive ideals that insist on moral accountability, the once-fashionable
goal of rehabilitation has been supplanted by an ideological shift that emphasizes
incapacitation as a core value.”).
49. FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 111 (2d ed.
1983) (“[I]t is the very presence of rehabilitative ideology and practice that is responsible for
the most debasing features of American corrections . . . . [S]tate-enforced therapy will
inevitably foster the abuse of offenders and result in gross inequalities in the administration
of justice.”).
50. See Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 25, at 109 (“Rehabilitation was blamed by
liberals for allowing the state to act coercively against offenders, and was blamed by
conservatives for allowing the state to act leniently toward offenders.”).
51. See id.
52. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 1558 & n.46 (quoting Michael S. Moore, The Moral
Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 182
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Punishment depends on the individual and her past criminal acts; it is not
concerned with society “or on the possible consequences of the infliction of
punishment.”53 Retributivism may refer to legalistic retributivism, which
focuses on law breaking as an indicator for the appropriate punishment, or
moralistic retributivism, the moral guilt that accompanies particular
criminal acts, also known as “just deserts.”54
Because of these conflicting theories of punishment, courts are faced
with determining how to sentence addicts. On the one hand, addicts may
pose costs and dangers to society because of their addiction.55 On the other
hand, drug court theory “meld[s] substance abuse treatment and
punishment,” combining theories of punishment looking to rehabilitate the
offender while maintaining an element of retributive punishment.56 These
competing theories of punishment have been utilized prior to and
throughout the creation of drug courts and their progeny.57
B. Formulating Policy: A Brief History
of Courts’ Struggles with Sentencing Addicts
The theories discussed in the previous section serve as the basis for
understanding how and why legislatures and courts have structured
sentencing policy for addicts. This section examines the evolution of
courts’ struggles to appropriately punish drug-addicted defendants while
maintaining the desire to rehabilitate.
One of the first efforts to address the issue of sentencing addicts was the
adoption of “status statutes.”58 For example, California implemented a
state statute that made it a criminal offense for a person to be “addicted to
the use of narcotics.”59 Upon review, however, the Supreme Court struck
down the California statute as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.60 The Court likened drug addiction to being “mentally ill, or
a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.”61 The Court decided that

(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987)) (“For a retributivist, the moral culpability of an offender
also gives society the duty to punish. Retributivism, in other words, is truly a theory of
justice such that, if it is true, we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is
achieved.”).
53. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 1558–59.
54. See id. at 1559–60.
55. The National Institute of Drug Abuse estimates that the total overall costs of
substance abuse in the United States exceed $600 billion annually. DrugFacts:
Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/understanding-drug-abuse-addiction (last
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/HP2K-ZB49].
56. Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1208 (1998).
57. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West), repealed by California
Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1972, ch. 1407, § 2, p. 2987 (West).
59. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 n.1 (1962).
60. Id. at 667.
61. Id. at 666–67.

864

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

criminalizing the status of “addict,” which it likened to punishing someone
for having a disease,62 did not merit criminal sanctions.63
Six years after the invalidation of the California statute, the Court
revisited the issue of how to treat addicts in criminal cases.64 In Powell v.
Texas,65 the Court, in a fractured decision, declined to extend its reasoning
in Robinson v. California66 to include crimes that were committed because
of alcoholism.67 In Powell, the defendant—who showed clear signs of
alcoholism—was convicted of public drunkenness under a Texas statute.68
The defendant challenged the conviction on the grounds that it violated the
Eighth Amendment.69 In a lengthy opinion, Justice Marshall, writing for
the plurality,70 discussed the implications of alcoholism and debated
whether it could be considered a disease.71 The Court ultimately decided
not to extend Robinson, distinguishing the case by reasoning that it was
Powell’s choice to be on a public street while drunk.72 The Court reasoned
that the defendant was punished not for his status as an alcoholic, but for his
public behavior.73
In his concurrence, Justice White opined that if it is not a crime to “have
an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics,” then it cannot “be a crime to
yield to such a compulsion.”74 Justice White saw no difference between the
statutes at issue in Powell and Robinson. However, he voted with the
majority because he did not think the punishment was cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment.75
The dissent in Powell saw this case as nothing more than an extension of
Robinson.76 Justice Fortas analyzed the question of whether the defendant,

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of
Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1527 (2004) (“The difference between the
Robinson and Powell opinions consists in their attitude toward penal welfarism and the
disease model of addiction.”).
65. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
66. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
67. Powell, 392 U.S. at 526.
68. Id. at 517.
69. Id. at 531–32.
70. The decision did not have a majority opinion. Three justices—Chief Justice Warren,
Justice Black, and Justice Harlan—voted with the majority opinion written by Justice
Marshall. Id. at 516–17. Justice White wrote a separate concurrence. Id. at 548 (White, J.,
concurring). Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Brennan joined Justice Fortas in a dissent. Id. at
554 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 522 (majority opinion) (discussing how there is no agreement in the medical
community on the meaning of alcoholism as a disease).
72. Id. at 526 (“[I]t is quite another [thing] to say that a man has a ‘compulsion’ to take a
drink, but that he also retains a certain amount of ‘free will’ with which to resist.”).
73. Id. at 533–34.
74. Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring) (“Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for
addiction under a different name. Distinguishing between the two crimes is like forbidding
criminal conviction for being sick with flu or epilepsy but permitting punishment for running
a fever or having a convulsion.”).
75. Id. at 553–54.
76. Id. at 569–70 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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who suffered from “chronic alcoholism,” should be subject to a criminal
penalty when his actions were only “a compulsion symptomatic of the
disease of chronic alcoholism” and not a matter of free will.77 The dissent
discussed the history of alcoholism in the United States, contending that,
because of the nature of the disease, “[i]t is entirely clear that the jailing of
chronic alcoholics is punishment” and that “there [is no] basis for claiming
that [serving jail time] is therapeutic (or indeed a deterrent).”78 Justice
Fortas argued that the use of a criminal penalty in this case was cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and thus the conviction
should have been overturned.79
The Court’s analysis of Powell’s “criminal” activity highlights the
complexity of sentencing alcoholics and drug addicts. While the plurality
argued that addiction should not be a get-out-of-jail-free card for offenders,
the four-justice dissent espoused the idea that the state should not punish
people for involuntary acts resulting from a “compulsion.”80 The
disagreement among the justices in Powell represents the pull between
rehabilitative and retributive values when determining drug treatment
programs within the criminal justice system.81
C. The Creation of Drug Courts
The previous section discussed the way in which courts sentenced addicts
prior to the creation of drug courts.
This section examines the
establishment of drug courts, beginning with judge-operated programs and
eventually extending into the vast network of state and federal drug courts
that exists today.82
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress tied drugs to drug
traffickers and terrorists, calling for strict sentences.83 These sentencing

77. Id. at 558.
78. Id. at 564.
79. Id. at 570.
80. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated on
other grounds, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]s five Justices would later make clear in
Powell, Robinson also supports the principle that the state cannot punish a person for certain
conditions, either arising from his own acts or contracted involuntarily, or acts that he is
powerless to avoid.”).
81. See Edwards, supra note 48, at 300 (finding that Powell represents a “complicated
relationship between medically based, rehabilitative constructs of aberrant behavior and
competing policy models that are hesitant to incorporate scientific findings into a system that
emphasizes personal responsibility and just deserts as core values”).
82. For an overview of the types and locations of drug courts currently in operation
across the country, see Types of Drug Courts, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS.,
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/models (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://
perma.cc/34V3-WGX2].
83. See Pub L. No. 99-570, § 2014, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (finding that “the increased
cooperation and collaboration between narcotics traffickers and terrorist groups constitutes a
serious threat to United States national security interests and to the political stability of
numerous other countries, particularly in Latin America”).
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parameters were echoed throughout the states84 and led to an increase in the
prison population as a direct result of drug arrests.85 However, many of the
defendants incarcerated on drug charges were nonviolent offenders.86
Some legal scholars became frustrated with the state of drug sentencing,
and as a result, a movement began in the late 1970s and 1980s calling for an
alternative to the existing sentencing policy.87 Legal scholars believed that
criminal dockets were overburdened with drug-related offenses due to the
“intensification of the war on drugs in the 1980s.”88
Some judges felt “discomfort” with the restricted sentencing discretion in
the existing drug laws, which left no room for treatment programs.89 As an
alternative, Judge Roger J. Kiley of Cook County, Illinois, devised a system
where he would meet with drug-addicted defendants and probation officers
from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. in an effort to address addiction more
directly.90 Similarly, federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein in the Eastern
District of New York implemented his own program to meet with
defendants charged with drug-related crimes.91
In 1989, United States Attorney Janet Reno—then the State’s Attorney of
Dade County, Florida—and Judge Stanley Goldstein established a
diversionary treatment program.92 Eleventh Circuit Chief Judge Herbert M.
Klein was given a one year leave of absence to address the serious and
“paralyzing” effect of drug offenses in Dade County.93 He studied the ways
84. The most famous example of the strict state statutes criminalizing drug use and
possession is the Rockefeller Drug Laws. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00–.65 (McKinney
2013); see also Maggio, supra note 45.
85. By the mid-1990s, drug convictions were the largest and fastest growing category in
the federal prison population, accounting for 61 percent of the total, compared to 38 percent
in 1986. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 475.
86. Only “21 percent of drug prisoners admitted to state prisons in 1991 had even a
single incidence of criminal violence in their background.” See id.
87. Michael Dorf and Jeffrey Fagan postulate that one of the core reasons for the
creation of drug courts was “the perception shared by the public and legal elites that the
crush of drug cases led to a crisis in the courts, characterized by an ineffective system of
punishment and a ‘revolving door’ that recycled offenders without reducing either their drug
use or criminality.” Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From
Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2003).
88. See id. at 1501–02.
89. See id. at 1502.
90. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 475. Judge Kiley began this practice in 1976, see id.,
more than ten years prior to the founding of the first official drug court.
91. Judge Weinstein explicitly opposed the federal sentencing guidelines that required
harsh sentences for drug offenders. See Joseph B. Treaster, 2 Judges Decline Drug Cases,
Protesting
Sentencing
Rules,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
17,
1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/17/nyregion/2-judges-decline-drug-cases-protestingsentencing-rules.html [http://perma.cc/4TJ8-S2UA]. Because he believed that the guidelines
emphasized arrests and imprisonment rather than prevention and treatment, Judge Weinstein
refused to accept drug-related cases to his docket. Id. Similarly, Judge Robert Sweet in
Manhattan argued that the sentencing guidelines for prohibiting drugs were “a mistake,”
saying “[i]t’s not cutting down drug use. The best way to do this is through education and
treatment.” Id.
92. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 475.
93. See 2 GERALD F. UELMEN & ALEX KREIT, HISTORICAL ESTABLISHMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK § 16:1 (2003).
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in which courts treated low-level drug crimes and found that most addicts
were not held accountable for their crimes.94 Instead, defendants were
often arrested, kept in jail for twenty-four hours, and let go on bail.95 The
same defendants would reappear several weeks later on a new drug-related
charge.96 Charges would begin to pile up, costing the state or local
authorities money.97
In an effort to address this cycle of reoffending, Judge Klein concluded
that diverting low-level, nonviolent drug offenders to a yearlong treatment
program would save the state money and could better treat their addiction.98
The original Dade County Drug Court was founded with the goal of
processing drug crimes in a cost-effective manner in order to reestablish a
link between the offender and the community, thereby reducing recidivism
rates and rehabilitating offenders.99 Drug courts sought to shift the policy
focus from regulating drug crimes through reducing drugs on the street to
focusing on treatment of drug addiction.100
Following the initial success of the Dade County Drug Court, similar
drug courts opened throughout the country.101 Today, there is at least one
drug court in each of the fifty states, as well as in the District of Columbia,
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam.102 In addition to the
originally realized general adult drug courts, many states have implemented
alternatives especially suited for subsets of society—including military
veterans, Native Americans, and juveniles.103
In 1997, the National Association of Drug Court Professionals, in
collaboration with the Bureau of Justice Assistance at the U.S. Department

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See William D. McColl, Comment, Baltimore City’s Drug Treatment Court: Theory
and Practice in an Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467, 467 (1996).
100. See id.
101. Ten years after the establishment of the Dade County Drug Court, 492 drug courts
were operational nationwide. See History, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS,
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited Oct. 21,
2015) [http://perma.cc/8UK8-QMEB]. As of June 30, 2014, there were 2968 drug courts in
operation throughout the country. See How Many Drug Courts Are There?, NAT’L DRUG CT.
RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ndcrc.org/content/how-many-drug-courts-are-there (last visited
Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/D9VP-3LD6].
102. See SHANNON M. CAREY, ET AL., NPC RESEARCH, EXPLORING THE KEY COMPONENTS
OF DRUG COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 18 ADULT DRUG COURTS ON PRACTICES,
OUTCOMES AND COSTS 1 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223853.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G2Z3-HMQM].
103. In addition to adult drug court programs, Veterans Treatment Court, DWI Court,
Family Dependency Treatment Court, Federal District Drug Court, Juvenile Drug Court,
Reentry Court, Reentry Drug Court, Tribal Healing to Wellness Court, and Back on TRAC:
Treatment, Responsibility, Accountability on Campus have been founded nationwide. See
Types of Drug Courts, NAT’L ASSOC. OF DRUG CT. PROFS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/whatare-drug-courts/types-drug-courts (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/7XTC-E4GU].
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of Justice, published Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components.104 The
report laid out ten key components that are necessary to consider when
treating drug addiction.105 These components have served as a guide to the
creation of alternative drug treatment programs.106
D. The First Generation of Drug Courts and How They Work
Drug courts work to ensure that defendants are accountable to the court
system while receiving drug treatment.107 They rely on “mentoring and
monitoring” addicts to help them in “rebuilding their lives.”108 The
programs combine high-level monitoring with a comprehensive treatment
program: judges use rewards and punishments to “condition” defendants to
be responsible for their actions.109 The first drug courts used two primary
models—the deferred prosecution model and the post-adjudication
model.110 Each of these models established eligibility requirements and
followed a basic treatment model.
1. The Deferred Prosecution Model
In deferred prosecution programs, also known as “pre-adjudication,” if
the defendant meets the eligibility requirements, she is diverted to the drug

104. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS
(1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/205621.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6CB-7FTN].
105. The key components are:
[1] Drug Courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice
system case processing . . . . [2] Using a nonadversarial approach, prosecution and
defense counsel promote public safety while protecting participants’ due process
rights . . . . [3] Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the
drug court program . . . . [4] Drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol,
drug, and other related treatment and rehabilitation services . . . . [5] Abstinence is
monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing . . . . [6] A coordinated
strategy governs drug court responses to participants’ compliance . . . . [7]
Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court participant is essential . . . . [8]
Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and gauge
effectiveness . . . . [9] Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective
drug court planning, implementation, and operations . . . . [10] Forging
partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and community-based
organizations generates local support and enhances drug court program
effectiveness.
Id.
106. See CYNTHIA G. LEE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., A COMMUNITY COURT GROWS
IN BROOKLYN: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE
CENTER 2 (2013), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/
Areas%20of%20expertise/Problem%20solving%20courts/11012013-Red-Hook-FinalReport.ashx (using the key components as a basis for formulating their own list of eleven
crucial elements for the founding of the Red Hook Community Justice Center)
[http://perma.cc/RMR8-QTLP].
107. See Dorf & Fagan, supra note 87, at 1502 (noting how drug courts combined
“popular demand for punitive responses” to the drug problem with notions of individual
responsibility and treatment).
108. Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 291.
109. Id.
110. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 476.
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court before pleading to a charge.111 This model “capitalize[s] on the
trauma of arrest” to motivate the defendant to immediately enter a treatment
program.112 If the defendant successfully completes the program, then her
record of arrest is usually expunged.113 If the defendant does not
successfully complete the drug court program, however, she is
prosecuted.114
There are three underlying approaches in the deferred prosecution model.
First, in a “diversion” approach, the case is dismissed upon successful
completion of the program.115 Second, a “pre-diversion” approach requires
that the individual plead guilty to the charges.116 After successful
completion, the plea is withdrawn or the case is dismissed.117 Finally, in a
“stipulated facts” approach, the defendant stipulates to the facts of her case,
and the charges are dismissed upon successful completion of the
program.118
2. The Post-Adjudication Model
In the post-adjudication model, the defendant pleads guilty to the
underlying charge, and the sentence is deferred or suspended while she
participates in the drug treatment program.119 If she successfully completes
the program, the sentence is waived and the conviction is often
expunged.120 This model is considered effective because the judge’s
consistent monitoring throughout the course of the program gives added
incentive to the individual to complete treatment.121
3. Eligibility Requirements
Before an addict is diverted to drug court, she must satisfy several
eligibility requirements.122 Eligibility for drug court programs varies
depending on the jurisdiction.123 Generally, courts look to the severity of
the charges,124 the type of charges, the defendant’s criminal history, and

111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 12, at 24.
114. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 476.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. (“The post adjudication model is successful only if there is pre-trial
monitoring of the defendant from the time of arrest.”).
122. See REMPEL ET AL., supra note 13, at 14.
123. Compare id. at 13–16 (describing New York State’s eligibility requirements), with
STATE OF N.J., MANUAL FOR OPERATION OF ADULT DRUG COURTS IN NEW JERSEY 10–12
(2002), https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/drugcourt/dctman.pdf (stating the eligibility
requirements for New Jersey drug courts) [http://perma.cc/JH66-3QX9].
124. See REMPEL ET AL., supra note 13, at 14.
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previous probation violations.125 Additionally, the defendant must have an
established alcohol or drug dependency.126 Some programs require that
individuals with a history of violent crimes be automatically excluded.127
Eligible defendants spend an average of twelve to eighteen months in
drug treatment, during which time the defendant is randomly drug tested on
a regular basis.128 The judge reviews the progress of the individual, who
may only graduate after continuous abstention from drugs and alcohol.129
If an individual fails a random drug test, she will be sanctioned, sometimes
resulting in jail time or community service.130 A defendant may be
terminated from the program if the court determines that she is not
benefitting from treatment or if she commits another crime while
enrolled.131
4. The Basic Treatment Program in Traditional Drug Courts
While the treatment program utilized by each traditional drug court
varies, most models follow a similar approach to medical treatment. The
Miami-Dade Drug Court provides a useful example for understanding a
version of the basic approach to medical treatment.132 There, each offender
Phase I,
must complete a three-step program to graduate.133
“detoxification,” seeks to end chemical dependency on drugs.134 If the
individual requires detoxification, the court transfers her to an independent
treatment provider, where an individualized treatment plan is created.135
During Phase II, the individual continues to attend counseling, but is no
longer in residential treatment.136 The individual structures her own
125. For example, many drug courts prohibit eligibility if the defendant is charged with a
violent crime. See id.
126. See RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS:
A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dp_
drugcourts.pdf [http://perma.cc/D522-2CWG].
127. In order to receive federal funding for drug court programs, the jurisdiction must
exclude violent offenders. See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorizations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 2952, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
128. See HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 12, at 7.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. For example, California requires an individual’s termination from the drug court
program and the reinstatement of criminal charges if
the court finds that (1) the defendant is not performing satisfactorily in the
assigned program, (2) the defendant is not benefiting from education, treatment, or
rehabilitation, (3) the defendant has been convicted of a crime specified . . . or (4)
the defendant has engaged in criminal conduct rendering him or her unsuitable for
the preguilty plea program.
5 EDWARD A. RUCKER & MARK E. OVERLAND, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PRACTICE: MOTIONS,
JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SENTENCING § 53:8, Weslaw (database updated Sept. 2015) (citing
Cal. Penal Code §§ 1000.3–.5(b)).
132. See supra Part I.C.
133. See Hora et al., supra note 5, at 482.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 483.
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treatment program while the judge monitors her progress.137 This phase
lasts for about fourteen to sixteen weeks.138 If the defendant regresses, the
judge may send her back through Phase I.139
Finally, the individual moves to the “aftercare” stage in Phase III.140
Here, the individual is introduced to “academic and occupational
preparation for a new type of life style.”141 The individual continues to
provide the court with urine samples to be tested for drugs and is
encouraged to maintain sobriety without the supervision of the court.142
This phase often lasts for about thirty-six weeks and contains the same
caveat as Phase II that if the individual fails or regresses at any point, she is
recycled through the earlier phases.143
The individual makes one final court appearance after the completion of
all three steps, at which point the charges are dismissed and the individual
graduates from the program.144 Twelve months after the successful
completion of the entire program, the court seals all records related to the
arrest.145
5. Criticisms of Traditional Drug Courts
Many scholars and criminal justice actors saw drug courts as the “magic
solution” to America’s drug problem.146 However, the newly formed courts
received—and continue to receive—criticism from various vantage
points.147 Some criticize drug courts from a treatment perspective.148 They
claim that because addiction is a disease, it is impossible to determine how
many times a defendant fails an element of treatment before she is
terminated from the program and subjected to criminal sanctions, making
the process “arbitrary.”149 These critics question why the criminal justice
system is involved at all in the treatment of a disease.150
A second criticism comes from defense attorneys, who find their place
within the drug court system inconsistent with traditional notions of

137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 484.
143. See id.
144. See id. In a drug court context, “graduation” refers to a successful completion of the
treatment program. See id. at 485.
145. See id. at 484.
146. Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1475 (2000).
147. See generally Miller, supra note 64. For a more detailed look at criticisms of drug
courts, see, for example, Goldkamp, supra note 29; Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on
Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 53–59 (2001).
148. See Hoffman, supra note 146, at 1475.
149. Id.
150. Id. (“If drug addiction is truly a disease that manifests itself in uncontrollable
behavior until treated, why is the criminal law involved at all as a backup to failed
treatment?”).
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defense.151 In criminal court, defense attorneys are advocates for the
defendant; their job is to get their client a favorable outcome.152 In drug
courts, however, this role becomes more difficult with the additional
treatment element in sentencing.153 Some defense attorneys believe that the
pressure for defendants to enroll in a treatment plan is quite strong,
sometimes requiring the defendant to plead guilty when they otherwise
would not have.154 Additionally, the contours of due process rights a
defendant waives when accepting guilty pleas conditioned on treatment are
unclear, which is disconcerting to defense attorneys.155
Finally, some believe that returning to rehabilitative ideals is misguided
and imprudent.156 These critics posit that “the emergence of drug courts
[is] a nostalgic yearning for the idealism of an earlier decade . . . that never
really existed.”157 They believe that the turn toward more punitive
sentencing in the 1970s was for good reason and was meant to address the
ineffectiveness158 of a rehabilitative approach.159 Critics of the drug court
movement advocate for “pulling back on the reigns” so that the programs
may be evaluated and modified as necessary.160
II. ALTERNATIVE DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS
In an effort to address some of the criticisms set forth in the previous
part, some jurisdictions have created alternative drug treatment
programs.161 This part addresses several models that have emerged as an
alternative to traditional drug courts. First, this part discusses community
151. See generally Quinn, supra note 147.
152. See Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the TwentyFirst Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV.
717, 792 (2008).
153. See Quinn, supra note 147, at 59.
154. See id. (noting the difficult choice defense attorneys have in counseling their clients
when their choice is between fighting their innocence behind bars or accepting a guilty plea).
155. See id. at 54–55.
156. See Goldkamp, supra note 29, at 926; see also Boldt, supra note 56, at 1217 (noting
that “treatment court officials place relatively greater emphasis on rehabilitative services
than do most other actors in the traditional criminal justice system”).
157. Goldkamp, supra note 29, at 926.
158. Francis T. Cullen articulated three widely adopted criticisms of rehabilitation as a
theory of punishment that led to its decline. Cullen, supra note 26, at 317. First, prisons are
more concerned with maintaining control than therapeutic ideals, rendering rehabilitation
while incarcerated obsolete. Id. Second, abuse of discretion of who receives treatment and
who goes to prison leads to arbitrary and even unjust decisions. Id. at 318. Finally, some
critics believe that if treatment is coerced through the courts, it is never truly effective. Id. at
318–19.
159. See Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community
Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 76 (2002). (recognizing the “disappointing lessons,
abuses, and poor track record of rehabilitation policies that preceded the shift toward the
more punitive justice aims in recent decades”).
160. See Quinn, supra note 147, at 74.
161. See Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of Accountability:
Consensus and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1573, 1573 (2003) (“They have been proposed as a new version of justice—one that makes
justice swift, visible and accountable, and thereby bridges the gap between communities and
courts.”).

2015]

ALTERNATIVE COURTS AND DRUG TREATMENT

873

courts, specifically, the Red Hook Community Justice Center (RHCJC) in
Brooklyn, New York, which incorporates community involvement with
drug treatment.162 Then, this part explores community-panel courts, such
as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court (“the WCC Court”) in
Iowa, which replaces the role of the judge with members of the
community.163 Finally, this part addresses swift sanction probation
programs, such as HOPE.164 These three programs use different policies
and procedural models to address issues surrounding sentencing and
treating addicts.
A. Red Hook Community Justice Center
Community courts were first founded with the goal of incorporating
community involvement in the criminal justice system.165 They seek to
ameliorate perceived problems in the criminal justice system in three
ways.166 First, community courts strive to bring “citizens and defendants
closer in a jurisprudential process that is both therapeutic and
accountable.”167 The courts are often multijurisdictional, placing various
aspects of the justice system—such as family court, criminal court, and
drug court—under “one administrative umbrella.”168 Second, the courts
focus on “social and behavioral origins of the problems” experienced by
their participants.169 Finally, community courts bring social services to the
community to which they may not have had access previously.170
The RHCJC relies, in part, on the “Broken Windows” theory.171 The
Broken Windows theory is “an outgrowth of deterrence theory” and
promotes the idea that “the presence of minor crime and other visible
conditions of disorder sends a signal to potential lawbreakers that any
crimes they commit are likely to be overlooked.”172 The theory argues that
one way to lower crime rates is to prosecute low-level crimes.173 By
monitoring crimes that make a neighborhood seem “rundown,” it sends a
162. See infra Part II.A.
163. See infra Part II.B.
164. See infra Part II.C.
165. See Malkin, supra note 161, at 1573 (noting the “explicit incorporation of the
community into the judicial process as a way to improve the justice system and empower
local communities”).
166. See Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice Through
Community Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 898 (2003).
167. Id.
168. Id.; see also Thompson, supra note 159, at 64.
169. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 898.
170. See id.
171. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 66–67 (“In accordance with the broken windows
theory, community courts typically focus on cleaning up minor ‘quality of life’ crimes . . . on
the assumption that this will lead to reductions in other types of crime as well.”).
172. Id. at 6.
173. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/?single_page=true (“[D]isorder and crime are
usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence.”) [http://perma.cc/H94UZ8TT].

874

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

signal to the community that the police are maintaining order, which
engenders “relie[f] and reasurr[ance].”174 As an outgrowth of Broken
Windows, RHCJC is “designed to permit the community—and the court—
to regain authority over conduct that threatens the community’s safety and
economic viability.”175 In so doing, some community courts prosecute
primarily low-level misdemeanors and violations, leaving violent and
felony offenders to the purview of the traditional criminal court system.176
The RHCJC was the nation’s first multijurisdictional community
court.177 Prior to the RHCJC’s creation, the neighborhood of Red Hook,
Brooklyn, had a predominantly poor population178 and was a “hotbed of
crime.”179 The issues in the neighborhood, however, were not just centered
around the violence, but also the deep mistrust of local law enforcement and
its geographical isolation.180 The RHCJC was founded following drugrelated violence in Red Hook’s public housing complexes.181 The
community court officially opened its doors in April 2000.182
174. Id. (noting that if police do not monitor low-level crimes, such as “window
breaking,” then “one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so
breaking more windows costs nothing”).
175. Thompson, supra note 159, at 66–67.
176. See id. at 66. It should be noted that the Broken Windows theory has received
criticism for its focus on low-level crimes. It is argued that this method of policing
disproportionately affects poor and minority individuals. See Steve Zeidman, Is ‘Broken
Windows’ Broken? Yes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/
opinion/broken-windows-broken-yes-article-1.1889011 (“Data show that a relative few zip
codes in majority black and Latino neighborhoods are home to more than half of the
arrestees in NYC.”) [http://perma.cc/3CHV-56TB]; see also Justin Peters, Broken Windows
Policing Doesn’t Work, SLATE (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/crime/2014/12/broken_windows_policing_doesn_t_work_it_also_may_have_killed_
eric_garner.html [http://perma.cc/R8RQ-ZXY3].
177. See Red Hook Community Justice Center, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/red-hook-community-justice-center (last visited Oct.
21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8S4D-54XK]. One judge—currently Judge Alex Calabrese—
oversees all criminal and civil cases at the RHCJC. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 36.
The RHCJC also houses a court attorney, a court clerk’s office, a resource coordinator, court
officers, a court reporter and interpreter, personnel from the Center for Court Innovation, an
alternative sanctions office, and members from various partner organizations, including the
District Attorney’s office, Legal Aid defense attorneys, and police precincts. Id. at 36–39.
178. The median income in the neighborhood in 1990 was $9500 per person, which was
less than one-third of the median for New York City as a whole. See LEE ET AL., supra note
106, at 23. Over 30 percent of the neighborhood’s working age men were unemployed and
78 percent of children in the neighborhood were being raised by a single parent. Id.
179. As quoted in the 1988 Life Magazine cover story, Red Hook had frequent shootouts
between rival gangs and drug dealers, and the author described the neighborhood by saying
“[t]here is a shooting every night and sometimes two . . . . It’s like Dodge City.” Id. at 23
(quoting Edward Barnes & George Howe Colt, Crack: Downfall of a Neighborhood, LIFE,
July 1988, at 100).
180. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 899 (citing the neighborhood’s crisis as
partly the result of “the low rating by citizens of the legitimacy of law and legal
institutions”).
181. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 25. Today, approximately 8000 of 11,000
residents in Red Hook live in the neighborhood’s housing projects, the Red Hook Houses.
See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 914.
182. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 1. The RHCJC was founded on the tenet of six
distinguishing features of community courts: (i) individualized justice, (ii) expanded
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RHCJC has three primary features. First, the court system utilizes
deterrence as a theory of punishment, looking to ensure that there is a
“certainty of meaningful punishment—including follow-up sanctions in
response to a defendant’s noncompliance with the original court order.”183
To accomplish this, judges require that defendants appear in court on a
regular basis to demonstrate compliance with the programs.184 Second,
RHCJC’s founders believed that intervention targeting the root problem of
an offender’s behavior is crucial to rehabilitation.185 As part of this
“intervention” stage, RHCJC employs drug treatment programs, social
services, and other community-based programs to engender positive change
in an offenders’ behavior.186 Finally, RHCJC uses procedural justice to
mend the distrust between people in the community and law
enforcement.187 The system looks to stimulate “voluntary compliance with
the law by enhancing the perceived legitimacy . . . in judicial decisionmaking as well as the cultivation of close ties to the community.”188
RHCJC’s model allows for greater discretion when deciding whether to
divert a defendant to drug treatment.189 In traditional drug courts,
defendants who have a violent criminal history are often not eligible for
treatment.190 Community courts, however, have greater discretion in
determining each defendant’s sentence or treatment.191 Because RHCJC
diverts defendants from various backgrounds to drug treatment, the

sentencing options, (iii) varying mandate length, (iv) offender accountability, (v) community
engagement, and (iv) community impacts. See id. at 3–4; see also Malkin, supra note 161, at
1578 (citing four main issues on which the founders of the RHCJC relied, including social
services for defendants and residents, resources for young people, participation in local
community service projects, and “the court’s ability to help the community improve public
safety”).
183. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 4–5.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 6–7.
186. See id. (“By treating the underlying addiction rather than merely punishing the
offender for the resulting crime, the Justice Center aims to break the cycle of recurrent
criminal behavior caused by drug addiction.”). The “intervention” methods available to the
court include drug treatment programs, job training, GED classes, computer labs, medical
examinations, mental health counseling, and family services. See Alex Calabrese, “Team
Red Hook” Addresses Wide Range of Community Needs, 72 N.Y. ST. B. J. 14, 14, 16 (2000).
187. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 7–9.
188. Id. at 4–5; see also Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 900 (“The creation of a court
physically closer to the community, more responsive to the problems that give rise to crime,
and accountable to the community to reduce crime and deliver remedial services, offers the
Court a transformative role that will involve citizens in the processes of social regulation and
control that are essential to crime prevention and justice.”).
189. See AUBREY FOX, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, A TALE OF THREE CITIES: DRUGS,
COURTS AND COMMUNITY JUSTICE 4–5 (2010), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/
default/files/Tale_3_Cities.pdf (“There are a number of people . . . who wouldn’t be eligible
for drug court given their criminal history.”) [http://perma.cc/AU7Z-HRBB].
190. See id. at 4.
191. See id. at 5.
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programs are more varied than traditional drug courts in substance and
length.192
Procedurally, the defendant and defense attorney consent to a clinic staff
member making an assessment to determine whether she has committed the
crime as a result of addiction.193 Clinic staff look to identify a variety of
possible symptoms, including addiction, psychological trauma, brain injury,
and mental illness.194 The assessment consists of extensive questioning and
a urine test.195 The clinic gives an individualized recommendation tailored
to the defendant and her particular treatment needs.196
With this assessment in hand, the prosecutor decides whether to charge
the defendant or divert her to a treatment program.197 The prosecutor and
judge are free to alter the suggested treatment plan at their discretion.198
Once the treatment plan is formulated, the defendant may choose to plead
guilty, with the agreement that upon successful completion of the program,
an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) will be entered.199
The judge has the discretion in more serious cases—those that would
traditionally call for incarceration—to enter a conviction, with treatment as
a condition thereof.200
RHCJC works with external providers to assist with providing treatment
to defendants.201 Health insurance often plays a role in matching a
defendant with a provider because RHCJC does not fund treatment.202
During the course of the treatment, the court consistently monitors the
defendant.203 The clinic also ensures that the defendant fulfills other
requirements of her sentence.204 This monitoring stage includes consistent
interaction with the clinic; staff members meet in groups to analyze the
defendant’s progress.205
Staff members attend weekly meetings to discuss individuals who may
not be complying with the program requirements.206 The group focuses on
192. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 94. While the RHCJC allows for varied
sentences, it may also lead to “the potential for similarly situated defendants to receive
dissimilar sanctions.” Id. at 96.
193. See id. at 90, 95–96.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 927 (“As a referral service, however, the
treatment clinic functions well, catering to individual addicts and their needs.”).
197. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 91.
198. See id.
199. See id. An ACD allows the defendant to avoid a criminal conviction and its
potential collateral consequences. Id.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 92 n.25.
202. See id. at 92. While many defendants in the RHCJC have Medicaid, others who are
ineligible, including undocumented immigrants, may not be able to receive certain services
such as methadone treatment for heroin addiction, mental health treatment, or the diagnosis
of a traumatic brain injury. Id.
203. See id. at 93.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. The judge, the RHCJC project director and deputy director, the clinical
coordinator, the resource coordinator, the alternative sanctions coordinator, assistant District
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defendants who have had attendance problems, failed a drug test, or
otherwise failed to meet a sentencing requirement.207 The group makes no
decisions regarding the defendant’s status in the program, as the policy
dictates that the court hears the defendant’s side of the story.208
Defendants usually attend court on the Thursday or Friday following the
list meetings.209 The judge meets with each defendant to discuss her
status.210 Beyond these formal meetings, the small size of the building
provides defendants with consistent interaction with court staff.211 There
are no formal guidelines for sanctions if a defendant fails an aspect of the
treatment program,212 allowing the judge to punish the defendants on a
case-by-case basis.213 Typical sanctions include writing an essay on the
merits of staying clean and community service.214
RHCJC provides prevention programs that target addiction before the
conviction of a crime.215 For example, RHCJC created the Red Hook
Public Safety Corps, which utilizes AmeriCorps volunteers and local
community members to assist with service projects, including painting over
graffiti, cleaning parks, and tutoring.216 The center also operates youth
programs, including sports teams, development programs such as a youth
court—where kids are taught how to mentor their peers in real world
cases—and a variety of technical and artistic classes.217
RHCJC’s approach has raised some concerns when compared to other
drug court programs. First, RHCJC’s informal atmosphere is contrary to a
“traditional legal perspective.”218 Additionally, more consistent and strict
sanctions than those utilized at RHCJC for noncompliance may provide
stronger incentives for defendants to stay clean.219 For example, the
Misdemeanor Brooklyn Treatment Court—a traditional drug court—
specifically lays out the potential jail sentences that the defendant will incur
if she fails a drug test.220 Conversely, RHCJC’s case-by-case method may

Attorneys, and Legal Aid defense attorneys attend these meetings, which are called “list
meeting[s].” Id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See Malkin, supra note 161, at 1579.
211. See id.
212. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 94. This stands in stark contrast to the HOPE
Program, which has clearly defined sanctions that are implemented regardless of the reason
for noncompliance. See infra Part II.C.
213. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 94.
214. See id.
215. See FOX, supra note 189, at 5.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. Malkin, supra note 161, at 1579–80 (describing the way in which court staff share
information with one another may raise “some concern that the meetings . . . allow
information detrimental to [the defense lawyer’s] clients’ interests to be revealed to the
judge”).
219. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 96; see also supra notes 212–14 and
accompanying text.
220. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 95.
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allow for the judge to take into account “legally irrelevant factors” when
sanctioning, potentially raising due process concerns.221 The sentencing
hearings that are required for all defendants who fail a stage in their
treatment, however, may assuage due process concerns.222
B. Community Court with a Twist:
The Woodbury County Community Drug Court
A second model that has emerged as a means of treating addicts within
the court system is the community-panel drug court, where trained
volunteers conduct hearings and render sentencing decisions.223 These
panels are given similar authority to judges and can administer sanctions
and rewards to program participants.224 A district court judge oversees the
program, but defendants only appear before the judge on the panel’s
recommendation.225 The panel, however, usually has the ability to send an
individual to jail for one to three days without seeing the judge.226
Generally, a community-panel court has four to eight panels, each
consisting of four to six community members, serving on a rotating
basis.227 The panel members come from a variety of professions,228 and
several are recovering addicts.229
Woodbury County Community Drug Court opened in July 1999.230
After seeing the pervasive problems within their community of rampant
drug use and corresponding low-level crimes, practitioners in Woodbury
County approached the judiciary with the hope of founding a drug court.231
However, due to a lack of available judges to assist, the committee had to

221. See id. at 96 (noting that the judge may “feel a personal stake” in the defendant’s
case, leading to varying sanctioning); see also Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 928 (“For
some, the trade-off of due process rights for treatment, implicit in the therapeutic court
model, is seen as a threat to delegitimize the new Court.”).
222. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 96; see also infra notes 441–42 and accompanying
text.
223. KRISTEN WHITE ET AL., THE IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH
AND EVALUATION, DRUG COURT PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT 3 (2008), http://iconsortium.
subst-abuse.uiowa.edu/downloads/other/DrugCourtProcessEvaluation.pdf [http://perma.cc/
QSN2-8LCC].
224. See id.
225. See id. If the panel recommends that an individual receive jail time or that his status
or probation be revoked, he appears before the judge to carry out the sanction. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. The list of professions that volunteer at community panel drug courts includes
teachers, principals, small business owners, nurses, barbers, computer technicians, reporters,
farmers, tattoo artists, motorcycle mechanics, and homemakers. See id. at 4.
229. See id.
230. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 296. The WCC Court’s mission statement
reads: “To demonstrate an innovative, comprehensive, and integrated approach to substance
abuse treatment among offending juveniles and adults by coupling the coercive power of the
court with substance abuse services.” Dwight Vick, Impact of Community-Panel Juvenile
Drug Court Judges in Woodbury County, Iowa, 1 POL. BUREAUCRACY & JUST. 20, 21 (2009).
231. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 295–96.
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find a creative solution.232 The WCC Court’s goal is to be a “last stop” to
rehabilitation while reducing incarceration costs and judges’ caseloads.233
The WCC Court uses a model similar to traditional drug courts.234
Eligible defendants are diverted to an alternative program focused on
treatment in lieu of incarceration.235 The decision makers are made up of a
four-person panel, with district court Judge John Ackerman serving as the
overseeing judge.236 This model decreases the role of the judge and “places
an emphasis on the relationships that are developed between the client and
the panelists, which in turn creates a higher level of accountability between
the client and the community.”237
To be eligible for the program, an individual must have an underlying
substance abuse issue as evidenced from the complaint or charging
instrument in her case.238 A drug court officer then administers the
Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory to the individual, a test used
to determine whether someone has a chemical dependency.239 If the
individual meets the eligibility requirements, she is assigned a “home” drug
court panel “based upon interest, learning style, needs and the ‘style’ of the
panel.”240
To graduate from the WCC Court, an individual must complete four
phases.241 First, the defendant must “stabiliz[e].”242 In doing so, the
participant must establish a treatment plan approved by the panel, agree to
randomized drug testing, break ties with friends or family who use drugs,
attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or Narcotics Anonymous (NA)
meetings, and acknowledge the need for recovery.243 Second, the
participant must complete the “acceptance” phase, where she must maintain
the above activities, find a sponsor in her recovery, and complete
The third phase, known as
community service, if necessary.244
“maintenance/aftercare,” lasts for approximately three to six months.245

232. See id.
233. See Vick, supra note 230, at 33. As of 2007, the court had treated 270 clients since
its inception, about 164 of which were juveniles. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 297.
234. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 297–98.
235. See id.
236. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 223, at 21.
237. Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 296.
238. See id. at 297.
239. See id.; About the SASSI Institute, THE SASSI INST., https://www.sassi.com/about-us/
(last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (stating that “the SASSI Institute is committed to helping people
who suffer from alcohol and other drug problems and the professionals who serve them”)
[http://perma.cc/TU36-LKWN].
240. See Vick & Keating, supra note 6, at 298.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.; MICHAEL F. NERNEY & ROBIN WRIGHT, OJP COURT CLEARINGHOUSE &
TECH. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, AM. UNIV., REVIEW OF THE WOODBURY COUNTY (SIOUX CITY,
IOWA) JUVENILE COMMUNITY DRUG COURT PROGRAM WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPROVING OPERATIONS AND ADOLESCENT TREATMENT SERVICES 5–6 (2002), http://jpo.wrlc.
org/bitstream/handle/11204/3332/1358.pdf?sequence=1 [http://perma.cc/262A-5UUR].
244. See NERNEY & WRIGHT, supra note 243, at 6–7.
245. See id. at 7.
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This phase encourages participants to find employment, develop a plan for
the future, and participate in a “leisure and relapse plan.”246 At the
completion of phase three, the participant graduates.247 The final phase,
entitled “recovery,” is meant to be “continuing and ongoing” after the
individual graduates from the program.248
The program provides various incentives and sanctions to encourage the
participants to stay clean.249 Incentives include verbal praise and applause,
certificates for the completion of each phase, a reduction in community
service hours, phase advancement, and a reduction in court costs.250 If a
participant fails a drug test or another prong of treatment, sanctions range
from having to make up missed appointments or assignments to increased
testing, placement in detention, placement in an inpatient treatment facility,
and complete termination from the program.251
The Gordon Recovery Center252 provides the treatment services, and they
are largely paid for by the managed care agency in Iowa.253 If the program
is not covered by the Iowa state agency, then Medicaid, private insurance,
or family members pay for the services.254
Some have suggested that community panels have several advantages
that may be preferable to recovering addicts.255 First, because defendants
report directly to community members, they may feel that there is an aspect
of accountability that is absent in a judge-administered program.256
Additionally, panel members volunteer their time to the program without
pay, which may indicate to participants that panel members care about
treating others, not that they are there because they are required to be.257
Finally, because volunteers—including former addicts—come from all
professions and positions in the community, the defendant may be more
likely to listen to someone with whom they can relate.258
246. Id.
247. See id. at 7–8. To graduate, the individual must have, at a minimum, twelve months
in the program, six months sober, consistently attended at AA or NA meetings, attended
group and individual sessions, completed community service, and paid any fines. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 8–9.
250. See id. at 9.
251. See id. at 8–9.
252. The Gordon Recovery Center is part of the Jackson Recovery Centers, a privately
owned chain of treatment facilities located throughout Iowa. See About Us, JACKSON
RECOVERY CTRS., http://www.gordonrecovery.com/aboutus.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/PK7F-YSR4].
253. See NERNEY & WRIGHT, supra note 243, at 10.
254. For a more detailed discussion on the interaction between insurance companies,
managed care systems, and drug courts, see ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION,
DRUG TREATMENT, MANAGED CARE AND THE COURTS: FROM CONFLICT TO COLLABORATION
(2004),
http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/managed_care.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F6H57JRH].
255. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 223, at 5 (“The presence of volunteers from the
community also may provide clients with a sense that members of the community care about
them and take a personal interest in their well-being.”).
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 4–5.
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C. Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement
While some jurisdictions work toward lowering drug crimes through
treatment, such as the RHCJC and the WCC Court, others use probation
and swift sanction programs to target addiction. In 2004, Judge Steven Alm
in Honolulu launched HOPE, targeting drug addicts through probation.259
HOPE’s goal is to lower recidivism rates while rehabilitating addicts by
implementing “swift, predictable, and immediate sanctions” each time they
violate the terms of the program.260 With reports of high success rates, both
Washington and California have adopted similar systems.261
Judge Alm incorporated the theory of deterrence into his probation
program.262 His basic theory was that “the threat of a mild punishment
imposed reliably and immediately has a much greater deterrent effect than
the threat of a severe punishment that is delayed and uncertain.”263 Judge
Alm also integrated theories of behavioral economics into his program.264
Unlike other drug treatment programs, HOPE is focused on remedying
the negative implications of the parole system.265 Probation violations have
accounted for more than half of the prison population growth since 1990.266
Judges usually have broad discretion to determine the parameters of
defendants’ probation, including random drug testing.267 Generally,
however, the consequences of breaking parole occur far later than the actual
violation.268 Instead, Judge Alm considered it necessary to provide swift
and consistent sanctions upon a violation of a term of a defendant’s

259. HOPE Probation, HAWAII’S ST. JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/special_
projects/hope/about_hope_probation.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/5B6FYV38]. The original pilot program targeted not only those convicted of drug-related
offenses, but also sex offenders and domestic violence probationers. See ANGELA HAWKEN &
MARK KLEIMAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MANAGING DRUG INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH
SWIFT AND CERTAIN SANCTIONS:
EVALUATING HAWAII’S HOPE 8 n.1 (2009),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/229023.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3EN-96YU].
260. HOPE Probation, supra note 259.
261. Some accounts predict that HOPE has reduced drug use by more than 80 percent and
days behind bars by more than 50 percent. See Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan P. Caulkins &
Angela Hawken, Rethinking the War on Drugs, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 22, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303425504577353754196169014 [http://
perma.cc/F28C-NEJ4].
262. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 7 (“Delivering relatively modest
sanctions swiftly and consistently is . . . likely to be both more effective and less cruel than
sporadically lowering the boom.”).
263. Jeffrey Rosen, Prisoners of Parole, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10prisons-t.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all&
[http://perma.cc/3RSQ-XBAN].
264. See id. In his article, Rosen reports that behavioral economists believe that “people
are more sensitive to the immediate than the slightly deferred future and focus more on how
likely an outcome is than how bad it is.” Id. Therefore, probationers may be more likely to
comply with immediate consequences. See id.
265. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 9.
266. See id. at 7.
267. The Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the ability to randomly drug test parolees as a
condition of their release. See State v. Morris, 806 P.2d 407 (Haw. 1991).
268. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 40.
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probation.269 Judges give parolees a warning in open court that “any
violation of probation conditions will not be tolerated.”270 If a parolee
violates a term of her probation, she will immediately be sentenced to jail
time.271
As part of the monitoring strategy, HOPE requires that probationers call
into court each weekday to determine whether they will be tested.272 Each
participant is assigned a color code at their initial hearing, and a different
color code will be chosen for randomized testing every day.273 If the
probationer’s color is selected, then she must appear before her probation
officer that day for a drug test.274 If the probationer fails to appear, the
court immediately issues a bench warrant.275
If the probationer fails the drug test, the probation officer completes a
“Motion to Modify Probation” form that is immediately given to the
judge.276 A hearing is held in conjunction with this motion within seventytwo hours, and the probationer is confined until such time.277 If the judge
confirms a violation, then the probationer receives a short jail sentence, to
be served in short order.278 Upon the completion of the jail sentence, the
probationer continues participation in HOPE, reporting to his probation
officer on the day of release and subsequently on a regular basis.279 If an
offender continues to violate the terms of the probation, then she is often
confined to an intensive substance abuse treatment service.280
Instead of the treatment approach to addiction found in the RHCJC and
the WCC Court, HOPE relies on strict sanctions and immediate
consequences to deter addicts from using.281 In HOPE, drug treatment is
only provided to participants if the probationer fails a drug test, thereby
269. See id.; see also Rosen, supra note 263, at 13 (“[P]eople are most likely to obey the
law when they’re subject to punishments they perceive as legitimate, fair and consistent,
rather than arbitrary and capricious.”).
270. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 13; see also Hawken, supra note 47, at
40 (noting that the central theory behind HOPE is “the commonsensical one that certainty
and swiftness count for more than severity in determining the deterrent efficacy of a
threatened punishment”).
271. Upon a violation, the parolee attends a hearing within seventy-two hours, when, if
the violation is upheld, he is sentenced to a short jail term, which may be served on the
weekend if the parolee is employed. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 13.
272. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 38.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
278. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 38.
279. See id.
280. In contrast to other drug treatment courts, HOPE only mandates drug treatment if the
probationer is not able to stay clean on her own. See id. at 48. Researchers posit that this
element of the program “economizes on treatment resources as probationers who are able to
remain drug free on their own are not required to enter a drug treatment program.” Id.
281. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., ADDICTED TO COURTS: HOW A GROWING DEPENDENCE ON
DRUG COURTS IMPACTS PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIES 11 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/addicted_to_courts_final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2VXTB6EN].
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only targeting those “who cannot stop using drugs on their own.”282
Participants do not have to meet eligibility requirements as they would in
other drug courts, accepting people with all variations of criminal histories
and different levels of addiction.283
Part of the theory behind HOPE’s infrequent use of drug treatment is that
not all drug abusers are addicts, and thus the expensive drug treatment
programs should be saved for those who need it the most.284 If a HOPE
probationer fails three or four drug tests, then she may be mandated to
attend a residential drug treatment program in lieu of probation
revocation.285 When the probationer is diverted to a residential treatment
center, her success in completely abstaining from drug use becomes an
additional condition for avoiding revocation of probation or a prison
stay.286 This “as needed” use of drug treatment may lead to cost savings
and ensure that spots in residential centers are open for those who require
outside assistance to stay clean.287
After the HOPE pilot program’s success in increasing probation
compliance, the Hawaii legislature expanded the program, which now
manages the probation of more than 1500 defendants.288
After several studies were published reporting HOPE’s success,289
Washington and California modeled their own programs on HOPE’s
principles and procedures.290 In November 2010, Sacramento, California,
started a HOPE pilot program.291 In 2011, Seattle, Washington, worked
with the Washington Department of Corrections to implement their own
swift-sanction program, named Washington Intensive Supervision
Program292 (WISP). The WISP pilot program launched in February 2011,
and Angela Hawken and Mark Kleiman conducted a twelve-month study of
the program’s male parolees.293 WISP shares the same foundational tenets
of HOPE while targeting a wider range of parolees, including higher risk

282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 32–33.
285. See id. at 33.
286. See id. at 33–34.
287. See id. at 33.
288. See id. at 8. A national HOPE program was introduced into the U.S. House of
Representatives on November 6, 2009. See H.R. REP. NO. 4055 (Nov. 6, 2009). The
proposition, while never passed, aimed to “reduce drug use, crime, and recidivism” and was
modeled after Hawaii’s program. Id.
289. See infra Part III.A.4.
290. See BERNARD WARNER ET AL., WASH. DEP’T OF CORRS., COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS
PRACTICES 2012 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 7 (2012).
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. For a more detailed discussion of WISP, see ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN,
WASHINGTON INTENSIVE SUPERVISION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT (2011), http://
www.seattle.gov/council/burgess/attachments/2011wisp_draft_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
M4SG-9YXX].

884

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

offenders.294 Additionally, several other states have discussions underway
to implement a form of the HOPE program.295
III. MEASURING SUCCESS THROUGH
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE STUDIES
Drug courts’ successes are measured by quantitative and qualitative
studies performed by the court’s personnel, independent organizations, or
scholars.296 The previous section introduced three different models used in
treating drug addiction.297 This part discusses and analyzes the programs’
successes, including a discussion of scholars’ research methods used in
compiling the results.
A. Quantitative Results of Alternative Drug Courts
This section reports the quantitative results of the three drug treatment
programs. First, this section addresses the reason that quantitative methods
are used.298 Second, it recounts the quantitative results for the RHCJC, the
WCC Court, and HOPE, including graduation rates and recidivism rates.
Finally, this section tackles some criticisms of each program based on these
results.
1. Why Use Quantitative Methods?
In measuring alternative drug treatment programs’ successes, researchers
often utilize quantitative methods as opposed to performing detailed
qualitative studies.299 The reason for this is twofold. First, quantitative
results are easy to measure.300 Researchers need only look to the rates of
graduation, recidivism, and other program statistics to determine numerical
success.301 Second, quantitative results enable comparison across various
294. See id.
295. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Hawaii Opportunity Probation with Enforcement
Project: A Potentially Worthwhile Correctional Reform, 116 LEGAL MEMORANDUM 1, 4
n.20 (2014).
296. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
297. See supra Part II.
298. When measuring the success of drug treatment programs, researchers often use
quantitative methods, such as graduation rate, recidivism rate, and other measurable factors.
Part III.B discusses reasons for which quantitative measures may not be enough and how
qualitative studies have been performed for other drug courts. See infra Part III.B.
299. See Holger Spamann, Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for
Comparative Law?, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 797, 798 (2009) (advocating for the use of
quantitative research in comparative law, stating that qualitative studies “shed light on the
same issue from different angles”).
300. See Kenneth B. Nunn, New Explorations in Culture and Crime: Definitions, Theory,
Method, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y vii, xxi (2006) (noting how quantitative methods focus
almost entirely on numerical analysis).
301. See RACHEL PORTER ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, WHAT MAKES A COURT
PROBLEM-SOLVING? UNIVERSAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE
1, 28 (2010), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/What_Makes_A_Court_P_S.
pdf [http://perma.cc/7ABQ-52J8]. In this comprehensive study, the Center for Court
Innovation utilized yes/no indicators to gather statistics on a variety of factors in problem-
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types of drug courts.302 Quantitative results are a straightforward way to
immediately determine what aspects of a drug court are producing increased
graduation and decreased recidivism rates in the short term.303
2. The Red Hook Community Justice Center
The RHCJC performed a comprehensive study, with the help of funding
from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), released in November
2013304 (“the Report”). The Report analyzes adult criminal cases arraigned
at the RHCJC between 2000 and 2009.305 In the Report, the RHCJC
compiled information regarding practices and recidivism rates at other
traditional misdemeanor and drug courts in Kings County.306 In analyzing
the drug treatment program, the RHCJC found that a total of 1452
defendants were diverted to receive treatment for addiction, an average of 5
percent of the total caseload over the ten-year period.307
a. Participation in Drug Treatment
The Report explains why individuals with certain underlying charges
were diverted to treatment programs more than others.308 For example,
marijuana and traffic offenses receive lighter sentences in comparison to
other drug or prostitution charges, thereby making the cost of the treatment
program disproportionate to the severity of the offense.309 The Report
hypothesizes that the reason for this is that the cases “assigned to drug
treatment appear[] to be related to the severity of the potential penalty for
the offense as well as to the tendency for the offense to be related to drug
addiction.”310 Specifically, certain offenses, such as prostitution, may be
committed to support a drug habit.311

solving courts, stating that “[t]his simplification may sacrifice important detail and nuance,
frequently reducing complex qualitative questions to quantitative measures.” Id. at 28.
302. See Spamann, supra note 299 (stating that “[p]rocessing . . . vast evidence requires
quantitative methods”).
303. While quantitative results make these measurements easier on their face, qualitative
studies may be necessary to determine what aspects of the programs have a lasting effect on
the participants. See infra Part III.B.1.
304. See generally LEE ET AL., supra note 106.
305. These statistics were compiled from the New York State Division of Criminal
Justice Services, the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, the Division of Technology of
the New York State Unified Court System, and the RHCJC’s internal records. See id. at 14.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 97. The study found the following numbers and percentages of individuals
were diverted depending on the underlying charge: violent/person/weapon: 113 people, or 3
percent; marijuana: thirty-eight people, or 1 percent; other drug: 795 people, or 22 percent;
petit larceny: forty-five people, or 9 percent; other property charges: ninety-three people, or
3 percent; prostitution: 107 people, or 7 percent; public order: 206 people, or 4 percent;
traffic: thirty-two people, or 1 percent; felonies: five people, or 6 percent; other: eighteen
people, or 2 percent. See id.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See id.
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The Report distinguishes between individuals who participated in one,
two, or more mandated long-term drug treatment programs.312 Fifty-two
percent participated in one treatment modality, 22 percent participated in
two treatment modalities, and 26 percent participated in three or more
treatment modalities from 2003 to 2009.313 There were a total of 722 cases
over the period.314
b. Graduation Rates
Between 2003 and 2008, a total of 44 percent of the defendants that
entered a long-term treatment program graduated.315 Eighteen percent of
the defendants failed the program.316 Seventeen percent had the status of
“closed-other,”317 and 22 percent of the cases were still open after 2008.318
During this period, 53 percent had a final disposition of convicted, 1
percent had an ACD entered, 34 percent were dismissed, and 12 percent had
a warrant issued for violating a term of the probation.319 In other words,
approximately 34 percent of defendants who agreed to drug treatment
successfully completed the program, having their charges dismissed.320
c. Recidivism Rates
RHCJC’s recidivism rates were compared with traditional courts.321 The
Report measures recidivism by analyzing the rearrest and reconviction rates
within a one- and two-year period.322 Overall, RHCJC defendants were
less likely to be arrested again than comparable defendants in the Kings
County Criminal Court.323
The Report also analyzes the recidivism rates of drug treatment
defendants.324 The Report analyzed 252 defendants from the RHCJC drug
treatment program who received a drug treatment mandate and 252
defendants who had “similar cases” from the Kings County Criminal
Court.325 Twelve of the 252 at the Kings County Criminal Court received
312. “Long-term” treatment programs are defined in the Report as thirty days or longer of
treatment. See id. at 90.
313. Id. at 98.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 101.
316. Id.
317. As noted in the Report, it is unclear whether “closed-other” and “not closed” both
denote a failure to complete the program. Id. at 100.
318. The completion rates for the six-year period are as follows: 42 percent in 2003, 49
percent in 2004, 47 percent in 2005, 48 percent in 2006, 38 percent in 2007, and 34 percent
in 2008. Id. at 101.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 100–01. The Report notes that the low completion rate “suggests that the
court may not have sufficient leverage over defendants to motivate them to fulfill the strict
requirements of drug treatment programs.” Id. at 100.
321. Id. at 123.
322. Id.
323. See id.
324. See id. at 124.
325. See id.
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drug treatment at the Misdemeanor Brooklyn Treatment Court.326 As the
Report notes, there was not a significant difference between the sample
groups.327 In RHCJC, 48 percent were rearrested within two years, while
defendants from the Kings County Criminal Court were rearrested at a rate
of 43 percent.328 The Report suggests that there is no significant difference
between the recidivism rates in part because the “type of drug treatment
intervention used in [RHCJC]—as opposed to deterrence and legitimacy—
may not be one of the primary mechanisms contributing to [its] overall
effectiveness in reducing recidivism.”329
d. Praise and Criticism
Public officials have praised RHCJC as a key reason for the decrease in
crime in the Red Hook neighborhood. For example, former Brooklyn
District Attorney Charles J. Hynes credited RHCJC as the primary reason
for the decrease in murders in two separate years since the court’s
inception—2003 and 2006.330 New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio spoke
at the facility at RHCJC in 2013 when he swore in the new police
commissioner, Bill Bratton.331 During Bratton’s inauguration, Mayor de
Blasio said that “the way to fight crime . . . is with the community.”332
Proponents and critics have pointed to several ways in which this model
addresses the underlying theories of punishment and ways in which it may
cause conflict. First, traditional courts may be required to implement
certain sanctions as a result of a failed element of the program.333 For
example, public housing often has a zero-tolerance policy when it comes to
drug use, so a criminal court judge may be required to evict a family from
their apartment if drug use is found.334 A community court judge, on the
other hand, may work with the housing authorities to enable an addict to
continue living in the residence so long as she is under the judge’s
supervision, allowing greater discretion.335

326. Id. at 124–25.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 125.
330. See, e.g., Charles J. Hynes, Community Courts Effective Says Brooklyn District
Attorney, S.F. SENTINEL, http://www.sanfranciscosentinel.com/?p=4330 (last visited Oct. 21,
2015) [http://perma.cc/P5XB-PZA8].
331. See Praising Red Hook Justice Center’s Approach to Public Safety, Mayor-Elect de
Blasio Names Bratton As Police Commissioner, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/praising-red-hook-justice-center%E2%80%99sapproach-public-safety-mayor-elect-de-blasio-names-bratt?url=project%2Fred-hookcommunity-justice-center&mode=project&project=Red%20Hook%20Community%20
Justice%20Center (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/U9M3-RBD7].
332. Id.
333. See Dorf & Fagan, supra note 87, at 1510.
334. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (noting the
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s ability to evict public housing tenants if
found with drugs).
335. See Dorf & Fagan, supra note 87, at 1509.
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The judge’s subjective discretion, however, has also raised concerns.336
Because determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, there may be
some constitutional concerns because sentencing is largely subjective.337
This is due to a shift in the court actors’ roles in a community court.
Generally, the judge oversees an adversarial proceeding, with the
prosecutor and defense counsel standing on opposing sides.338 However, at
RHCJC, judges act not only in their traditional role, but also as an advocate,
a broker of social services, and a part of the community.339 The judge in a
community court may not have the requisite expertise for all potential
arising conflicts.340
Additionally, long-term drug treatment programs make up a small
amount of RHCJC’s caseload, while utilizing a large percentage of the
court’s resources.341 While the treatment program is catered to each
individual defendant, there may not be the same incentive to stay in line
with the program’s mandates due to relaxed judicial supervision and lack of
structure.342 These concerns may represent some weaknesses within
RHCJC and community justice centers, generally.
3. The Woodbury County Community Drug Court
The WCC Court has received attention due to its unique structure in
using community volunteers as the primary means of administering drug
treatment.343 Several studies have tracked the program’s successes and
failures. First, Dwight Vick performed a multipart study, analyzing various
aspects of the program.344 The studies examine the program’s impact on
recidivism rates, look at its cost-effectiveness, and make several
suggestions for how the WCC Court can improve in the future.345

336. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 159, at 79.
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. See id. (expressing concern that “drug courts forego whatever safeguards the
conventional construct offers by instructing judges to play a more active and interested
role”).
340. See id.
341. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 103.
342. See id.
343. See, e.g., Nick Hytrek, Woodbury County Drug Court a Success, Study Says, SIOUX
CITY JOURNAL (July 16, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/woodburycounty-drug-court-a-success-study-says/article_75ee7751-3f2e-506b-8738-dbe7bd1b5e13.
html [http://perma.cc/FAX2-EVDB].
344. See generally Dwight Vick, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Woodbury County,
Iowa’s Community-Panel Drug Court Program, 1 POL. BUREAUCRACY & JUST. 44, 47
(2002); Vick, supra note 230; Vick & Keating, supra note 6.
345. See generally Dwight Vick, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Woodbury County,
Iowa’s Community-Panel Drug Court Program, 1 POL. BUREAUCRACY & JUST. 44, 47
(2002); Vick, supra note 230; Vick & Keating, supra note 6. It should be noted that Vick’s
studies focused primarily on analyzing the program’s effect on juveniles and did not do a
comprehensive study on its effect on adults. Therefore, the rates here may differ from
studies of other drug courts.
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Vick analyzed the court’s success through two major categories:
graduation and recidivism rates.346 In his analysis, Vick determined that
100 percent of the clients used marijuana at least once prior to treatment, 23
percent admitted to using cocaine, 90 percent used alcohol, and slightly
more than 25 percent admitted to using methamphetamines.347 About twofifths participated in the program for less than six months.348 Thirty percent
were involved with the program for six months to a year.349 The remaining
clients participated in the program for over one year.350
a. Graduation Rates
When analyzing the graduation rate of participants, Vick found that 60
percent of men graduated, while 63 percent of women graduated.351 Clients
had a harder time graduating within the first stages of the program.352 Only
62.5 percent of clients successfully completed the program if their treatment
plan called for graduation within the first four months.353 Conversely,
approximately three-fourths of participants who spent more than four
months in the program successfully graduated.354
b. Recidivism Rates
Of the WCC Court’s graduates, 44 percent did not recidivate.355
However, the study notes that of the 66 percent that did recidivate in some
way, many were likely to commit a drug-related crime: only 20 percent of
the graduates who did recidivate committed a non-drug related, nonviolent
crime.356 In analyzing the recidivism rates, Vick also noted that 54 percent
of marijuana users, 53 percent of alcohol users, and 50 percent of
methamphetamine users recidivated.357

346. See generally Vick & Keating, supra note 6.
347. See id. at 308.
348. See id. at 309.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See id. at 311.
352. See id. at 313.
353. See id. at 313 n.201.
354. See id. at 313.
355. Id. Here, recidivism was measured by looking at citations and convictions recorded
in Woodbury County until December 31, 2004. Id. at 310. Vick found that 53.3 percent of
graduates did not recidivate. Id. at 318–19. He compares this to the national average rate of
recidivism in juvenile courts—30.8 percent—as opposed to a little over 46 percent here. Id.
at 319. He distinguishes that national study because it only accounted for two years after
graduation. Id. However, it should be noted that while this study began in 1999, the study
does not distinguish between those who graduated in 1999—with five years between their
graduation date and the end of the study—and those who graduated in 2004—with less than
a year between their graduation date and the study’s completion.
356. See id. at 313–14.
357. See id. at 314 n.207.
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4. Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement
State legislatures358 and federally funded researchers359 have
commissioned several studies to examine the effectiveness of swift-sanction
probation programs. The studies analyze the programs’ successes in
comparison to other probation practices.360 They use such indicators as
number of failed drug tests, missed appointments, and other probation
violations.361
As part of the procedure at HOPE, drug tests are performed both
randomly and in accordance with prescheduled appointments.362
According to one study, probationers tested positive over half the time
during the three months prior to their probation.363 In the first three months
of participation, probationers had a positive drug test rate of 9 percent,364 as
compared with the comparison group who tested positive 33 percent of the
time in the same period.365 Finally, after six months, HOPE probationers
tested positive at a rate of 4 percent while the comparison group tested
positive at a rate of 19 percent.366
Hawken and Kleiman found that of those who tested positive once, only
half tested positive a second time.367 Of those with two positive tests, only
half had a subsequent positive test.368 The probationers who tested positive
more than once were those who not only received sanctions, but who also
were recommended for enrollment in a drug treatment program because
they “did not desist from drug use under sanctions pressure alone.”369
Hawken and Kleiman also measured the frequency with which
probationers missed their appointments.370 During the three months prior
to enrollment, HOPE participants missed appointments with their probation
officers 14 percent of the time.371 During the first three months of
participation in the program, HOPE probationers missed 4 percent of
appointments, showing a 71 percent decrease in missed appointments.372
358. See, e.g., WARNER ET AL., supra note 290.
359. See, e.g., HAWKEN & KLEIMEN, supra note 259.
360. Because HOPE is used as a probation measure as opposed to a comprehensive drug
treatment program, results in the form of graduation and recidivism rates are not available.
361. See HAWKEN & KLEIMEN, supra note 259.
362. See id. at 17; see also supra note 271 and accompanying text.
363. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 17 (finding that 53 percent of drug tests
in the first three months were positive). In this study, Hawken and Kleiman used a
comparison group against which HOPE was compared. The group consisted of probationers
who “continued on probation as usual.” Id. at 13–14. For this group, there is no random
drug testing; rather, the probationers appeared at prescheduled appointments once per month.
Id. at 14.
364. Id. at 18. This represents an 83 percent decline in the positive test rate. Id.
365. See id.
366. See id. at 18–19.
367. See id. at 19.
368. See id.
369. See id. at 19–20.
370. See id. at 21.
371. See id. Comparatively, the comparison group missed appointments at a rate of 9
percent. See id.
372. See id.
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Meanwhile, the comparison group had a 22 percent increase in missed
appointments, missing them at a rate of 11 percent.373 After the six-month
mark, HOPE probationers missed their appointments at a rate of 1 percent,
while the comparison group missed at a rate of 8 percent.374 Hawken and
Kleiman attributed the dramatic decrease in the rate of missed appointments
to swift sanctions and speculated that “most probationers are highly
compliant with scheduled appointments.”375
Finally, Hawken and Kleiman measured the program’s success by
looking at how many participants had their probation revoked as compared
to the control group. They found that 9 percent of HOPE probationers had
their probation revoked due to noncompliance, compared to 31 percent of
the comparison group.376 Similarly, HOPE probationers spent far fewer
days in jail as a result of probation violations than the comparison group.377
B. Qualitative Results
This section discusses qualitative studies that measure participants’
perception of the treatment programs.
This section examines the
ethnographic data uncovered through questionnaires and interviews in
RHCJC, the WCC Court, and HOPE. Then, this section addresses other
qualitative studies of related drug treatment programs.
1. Why Use Qualitative Studies?
Qualitative results amplify quantitative studies in analyzing drug
They provide information
treatment programs’ effectiveness.378
“compar[ing] the perceptions of those who succeed[ed] in a drug court with
those who fail[ed].”379 Quantitative studies may not be sufficient because
of the ways in which they are conducted. For example, in studying
recidivism, it is nearly impossible to ensure that “the differences found in
recidivism reflect primarily criteria and processes of selection for drug court
handling rather than program effects of the drug court itself.”380

373. See id.
374. See id. at 22.
375. See id.
376. See id. at 24.
377. HOPE probationers spent an average of 111.6 days in prison and 18.9 days in jail,
while the comparison group spent an average of 303.4 days in prison and 20.1 days in jail.
See id. at 26.
378. See Nunn, supra note 300, at xxi (“[Q]uantitative methods are based on an
unquestioning view of objectivity that, while helpful for some purposes, is ineffective for
interpretation and unable to access and describe the social construction of reality.”).
379. Andrew Fulkerson et al., Understanding Success and Nonsuccess in the Drug Court,
52 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1297, 1300 (2012).
380. See Loreen Wolfer, Graduates Speak: A Qualitative Exploration of Drug Court
Graduates’ Views of the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Program, 33 CONTEMP. DRUG
PROBS. 303, 305 (2006).
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2. RHCJC Interviews and Questionnaires
The RHCJC Report recounts ethnographers’ findings from John Jay
College of Criminal Justice who interviewed 100 misdemeanor offenders in
the Red Hook neighborhood.381 As compared to Brooklyn’s downtown
criminal court, offenders who were interviewed responded that Judge
Calabrese and the RHCJC team were largely more lenient, were more
caring, and would sentence drug offenders to drug treatment programs
rather than jail.382 The study, however, did not report the effectiveness of
the drug treatment programs administered by RHCJC, but rather the
offenders’ general perception of the community court and its actors.383
3. Perception of the WCC Court
In addition to the quantitative results, Vick found that the use of panel
members engendered mostly positive feelings among the program’s
participants.384 The panel was able to develop “personal as well as
professional” relationships with the participants.385 However, Vick
reported that volunteers had two major concerns when interviewed. First,
there was a lack of coordination among the agencies involved in the
treatment process, which may have lead to clients relapsing due to the loose
structure.386 Additionally, Vick described the interaction among the panel
members during the meetings: that volunteers were sometimes passing
notes, whispering, and talking under their breath.387
Additionally, two years after the court’s inception, Michael F. Nerney
and Robin Wright conducted a review of the WCC Court, also specifically
analyzing its effect on adolescent treatment.388 There, the researchers
provided several recommendations for the future of the community panel
treatment program.389 First, they suggested training the treatment providers
and panelists so they better understand the variety of issues that may be
Second, they suggested having more positive
affecting addicts.390
interactions between the participants and the court’s staff so as to publicly
reward good behavior.391

381. For a more detailed description of the study, see LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 21–
22 & app. E.
382. One survey respondent reported that “[a]bout 5 years ago, I got in trouble for some
drugs, and instead of putting me in jail, [Judge Calabrese] put me in a drug program. If they
bring you to 120 Schermerhorn, you’re going to jail. Over there [in Red Hook], it’s a lot
better.” See id. at 40.
383. See id.
384. See generally Vick, supra note 230.
385. See id. at 30.
386. See id.
387. See id.
388. NERNEY & WRIGHT, supra note 243.
389. See id. at 11–13.
390. See id. at 11.
391. See id. at 11–12.
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The Iowa Consortium for Substance Abuse and Research and Evaluation
also conducted a study regarding perceptions of the WCC Court.392
Researchers evaluated the program by analyzing interviews with the court’s
staff members.393 Staff members made several suggestions for improving
the WCC Court, including increased commitment and consistency of
panels, more incentives for completing a stage of treatment, and more
funding for treatment services.394 This study did not survey program
participants.395
4. Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement Questionnaires
In a review of drug offenders diverted to the HOPE probation program,
Hawken anonymously surveyed a sample of 167 HOPE probationers.396
She interviewed probationers and others involved in the program, including
prosecutors, public defense attorneys, probation officers, judges, and other
court staff to determine stakeholders’ perception of the program.397
Hawken found that clients had a mostly positive perception of the
program regardless of how they entered the program, whether they were
incarcerated, and whether they received unwanted drug treatment as a
condition of a violation of probation.398 In response to open-ended
questions, many clients responded that the program was beneficial.399 A
majority of participants reported that the program was not too strict and that
it was useful in reducing drug use400 and improving relationships.401
Some were unsatisfied with the subjective position of the judge.402
Program participants—including defendants’ probation officers,
prosecutors, public defenders, and even some judges—reported that the
variation between judges in the severity of sanctions may be problematic.403
Those who received stricter sentences as a result of a probation violation
However, a
often blamed judicial bias, including ethnic bias.404
392. WHITE ET AL., supra note 223.
393. Id. at 91–92.
394. Id. at 92.
395. For a list of the questions used in these interviews, see id. at 108–10.
396. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 43.
397. See id.
398. Fewer than 10 percent reported a negative perception of the program. See id. at 42.
Of those who were incarcerated during the time of their interview, only 12 percent claimed a
negative perception. Id. at 43. Even among those who received mandated drug treatment
due to noncompliance with the probation guidelines, only 14 percent reported an
unhappiness with the program. Id.
399. Hawken reports that one individual described the program as “strict, friendly, and
fair,” while another stated, “[d]on’t give up on us! It’s a matter of time before it will sink
in.” See id. at 43.
400. Participants recognized that their choice was between “the drug or jail,” and thus the
daily call-in system and the randomized drug testing had a positive effect on their
recovery—96 percent reported that the regular random drug testing helped avoid drug use.
See id.
401. See id.
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. See id.
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comparison of the data shows that the difference is not between offenders,
but instead between judges.405
This qualitative study did not measure continued sobriety or quality of
life among past participants. Hawken and Kleiman acknowledge this
shortcoming, stating that the probationers were only studied while they
were participating in the program.406
5. Other Qualitative Studies
The qualitative studies that have been performed with respect to the
effectiveness of drug treatment programs have been minimal. One such
study was done with participants in the Greene County Drug Court in
Arkansas.407 There, the study interviewed fifteen recruited participants,408
including some individuals who were in county jail and others who were
graduating from the program.409 All questioning was done within twelve
months of the program’s completion.410 The study mostly analyzed the
varying reasons for entering drug court411 and the participants’ satisfaction
therein.412
The study found, generally, that individuals were largely unhappy with
the lack of confidentiality, that the program often only utilized counselors
who specialized in alcoholism as opposed to drug addiction, that judges
were largely subjective, and that individuals disliked the frequency of incourt appearances. Some individuals considered this final problem the
catalyst for their “failure” in the program.413 A key distinction between
those who completed the program and those who did not was that those
who “failed” out of the program perceived the judge as unfair.414
The study also analyzed whether the individuals were able to use the
drug court program as a “chance to repair problems that their past drug
abuse had caused to their family, friends, and community.”415 Sixty-seven
percent of the graduates of the program and 57 percent of the
noncompleters reported that their participation in the drug court program
helped them regain the trust of their family, friends, and community.416
405. See id. This perceived—albeit incorrect—bias is further evidence of why uniform
sanctions may lend credibility to drug treatment programs. See infra notes 439–40 and
accompanying text.
406. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 48 (noting that participants’ “long-term drug use and
criminality is an important remaining question” to measure the success of HOPE); see infra
note 455 and accompanying text.
407. Fulkerson et al., supra note 379.
408. The fact that the participants were recruited may show a selection bias in the study:
by selecting only those that were willing to comply with the terms of the study, it may be
that the interviewees represented only a subset of drug court participants. See id. at 1304.
409. See id. at 1303.
410. See id.
411. Many stated that they were advised to enter the program. Id. at 1305.
412. All but one person was satisfied with the program. Id. at 1305–06.
413. See id. at 1306–08.
414. See id. at 1312.
415. See id. at 1308.
416. See id.
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Some suggested awareness that their behavior made friends and family
“victims” and considered the program restorative.417
The report, based on these findings, concluded that the drug court
program benefited participants because they were “made accountable for
their behavior and [were] required to adhere to a rigorous schedule of
counseling, 12-step meetings, drug testing, meaningful employment,
community service, and regular monitoring of progress by the drug court
judge.”418
This qualitative study is one example of an in-depth measurement of the
long-term effects of a drug treatment program and may serve as an example
to future studies.419
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE POLICIES AND STUDIES
Various aspects of each alternative drug court discussed in Parts II and III
have been effective, while others conflict with the rehabilitative goals of
drug courts.420 This part examines and suggests several policies that
alternative drug courts should adopt that consider the nature of addiction, as
well as incentives for defendants to get and stay clean. First, this part
addresses several aspects of each of the three alternative drug courts that
may be most effective going forward. Second, this part discusses the need
for long-term qualitative studies to better determine which policies are most
effective in rehabilitating addicts in the court system.
A. How to Address Addiction in a Retributive System:
Suggestions for Future Drug Courts
While drug treatment programs will likely always have slight variations
among jurisdictions, there are several aspects of drug treatment that should
be implemented in every drug court. This section provides three
suggestions that may lead to a deeper connection between the court system
and the issue of drug addiction. First, drug courts should maintain an
informal atmosphere, where a variety of court actors, health care providers,
social workers, family, and other members of the community are involved
in the process. Second, drug courts should adopt consistent and predictable
sanctions other than jail time to be implemented in the event of program
violations.421 Third, regardless of the model, rehabilitative treatment—not
punishment—should be the primary focus of drug courts.

417. See id. at 1309.
418. See id. at 1313.
419. See infra Part IV.B.
420. See Boldt, supra note 56, at 1246 (“This conflict is brought into clearer focus when
the analysis is centered on the imperfect fit between the adversary system and rehabilitative
regimes.”).
421. However, unlike HOPE, incarceration should be saved for the most serious cases.
Labeling a drug addict as a criminal may be counterproductive to the goal of long-term
rehabilitation.

896

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

1. Maintain a Trustworthy and Informal Atmosphere
Procedural justice is one drug court component that adds legitimacy and
leads to increased success.422 Procedural justice should include not only a
perceived fairness in the courtroom, but also an atmosphere that engenders
trust and a holistic approach to determining an appropriate treatment
program or sanction. There are several small measures that drug courts
should take to strengthen procedural justice.
First, drug courts should involve a variety of actors when treating addicts.
As is practiced at RHCJC,423 drug courts should utilize social workers,
specialists trained in drug treatment and addiction, community members,
aid organizations, and others that may contribute to appropriately crafting a
treatment program.
Having these individuals available will ensure two things. First, the
variety of actors will guarantee that defendants understand that they have
access to and support from more than the traditional court actors—the
judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney—involved in the decision-making
process. Because individuals often seek to identify themselves with
groups,424 they may act in accordance with the group’s decision—i.e., the
decision of the group of individuals determines the parameters of the
program—even if it is against each individual’s self-interest.425 By
intertwining the authority of the court with the community’s approval,
defendants may be more likely to view the decision as legitimate and be
more open to compliance.426
Second, drug treatment experts should be required to help determine the
appropriate treatment for a defendant. A judge, while knowledgeable in
many areas, may not be an expert on the psychological aspects of addiction
or on the ways in which one sanction will affect the defendant outside the
courtroom—by losing her job, her home, or her family.427 By having
several people involved in the decision-making process, a defendant is
guaranteed a treatment program that is personally crafted to her needs by an
expert with the requisite knowledge. Crafting an appropriate sentence for a
drug-addicted defendant cannot be one-size-fits-all. Every addict is
422. RHCJC names procedural justice as one of the main theories upon which the court is
founded. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 7–8; see also supra notes 186–87 and
accompanying text.
423. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (recounting the people who attend
meetings discussing defendants’ progress).
424. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 9.
425. See id. For a more in depth discussion on group identity theory, see Alex Geisinger,
A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 642
(2004).
426. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 9.
427. The idea that one criminal charge can result in a domino effect of other
consequences is represented in the theory of holistic defense. See generally Michael Pinard,
Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry into
Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1067 (2004) (describing holistic
defense as “encompass[ing] the various underlying issues that often lead to clients’
experiences with the criminal justice system, with the aim of addressing those circumstances
and preventing future criminal involvement”).
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different, with varying psychological, health, and personal needs. It is
crucial that this is taken into account when determining how to make—and
who should make—the ultimate decisions for treatment.428
One way to accomplish this is through the program implemented by the
WCC Court.429 There, the court employs, in lieu of a judge, a panel of
community members who make the ultimate decision on how to sentence
drug court participants.430 While the panel may not have professional
experts, it may instill a sense of legitimacy in the defendant. A defendant
may be more willing to listen to a group of four people that have been
through the same process and have stayed sober than a judge who may not
have had the same experience.
In addition to seeking procedural justice through the decision-making
process, drug courts should maintain an informal courtroom that places the
defendant on the same level—literally and figuratively—as the court actors.
First, as is done at RHCJC, the judge should sit at the same level as the
defendant as opposed to sitting on an elevated bench.431 The defendant
should receive public praise for successfully completing elements of her
treatment. For example, the judge and court staff may applaud, provide
verbal praise, or award offenders for particularly strong progress.432
Further, the judge should always converse directly with the defendant,
ask her to tell her own story, and ask for justification if she violates a term
of the treatment program.433 This is particularly important in situations in
which the defendant may have tested positive for drugs during a follow-up
appointment or violated a term of her probation or treatment program.
Instead of sanctioning an individual with no explanation allowed,434 it is
important to have a hearing during which individuals may defend
themselves, provide explanation, or discuss with the judge a way to avoid
further violations.
Allowing the offender to participate in decision making lends legitimacy
to the process and encourages the addict to follow the treatment plan and
rehabilitate.

428. While the treatment programs should be formulated on a case-by-case basis,
sanctions for violations thereof should be predetermined and consistent, allowing for slight
variations between defendants. See infra notes 435–44 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 223–58 and accompanying text.
430. See id.
431. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 8 (describing this set up as a design that is
“intended to promote individual dignity”).
432. See supra notes 249–50 (discussing the procedures at the WCC Court for praise).
433. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 8 (“[J]udges are advised to treat individuals with
respect, afford all parties the opportunity to be heard, and clearly explain the rationale behind
their decisions.”).
434. While HOPE has a hearing to determine whether there was an actual violation, the
program does not allow for the probationer to put on a defense, see Hawken, supra note 47,
at 38, while the RHCJC allows for a hearing with the possibility of presenting a defense
following any violation, see LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 93–94.
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2. Implement Swift and Predictable Sanctions
Drug courts should utilize immediate and predictable sanctions that apply
to violations of the program or parole. While a punishment may have slight
variations among defendants with the same violation, it should be uniform
practice to apply sanctions for all defendants who commit each particular
type of violation. The sanctions should be known, immediate, and
consistent in kind both among judges and among defendants. The
sanctions, while predetermined and immediate, should not include
incarceration.435
The sanctions should be uniform according to the type of violation, while
still leaving room for slight variations among defendants based on their
particular circumstances. This would result in a range of predetermined
sanctions for each violation. For example, missing an appointment would
always result in increased court appearances. However, the number of
increased court appearances could vary among defendants depending on
their particular circumstances and the reasons for which the appointment
was missed.436 Because of the individualized needs of each defendant, in
the event of a violation, a hearing should be held to determine the nature of
the violation and the appropriate sanction, according to the range already in
place at the drug court. This would ensure that defendants are aware of the
consequences of violations while still allowing drug courts to treat the
individual needs of each defendant.
The sanctions should be uniform and swift for three reasons. First,
individuals are not forward thinking and may respond more strongly to
immediate consequences.437 For example, the defendant who knows that
she will receive a punishment several months in the future is much more
likely to violate the terms of her probation than the defendant who will be
given an immediate sanction.438 Therefore, if the sanction is known and
immediate, a defendant may be more likely to comply with the terms of the
sentence or probation.
Second, uniformity among sanctions may provide more legitimacy to the
drug court proceedings. If two similarly situated defendants receive
different sanctions for an unexcused probation violation or different
treatment plans—one receiving increased court appearances and the other
termination from the program—they may not perceive the decision to be
legitimate, thus threatening their treatment. For example, in the HOPE
435. As some scholars have speculated, incarceration may never be an appropriate means
of rehabilitating an addict. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 152, at 724 (“[I]t is naive to
believe that merely incarcerating a substance abuser, that is, physically incapacitating them,
will lead to recovery from addiction or cessation of alcohol or other drug use.”). For this
reason, incarceration should be used sparingly here.
436. See infra notes 441–42 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 212–14 and
accompanying text (discussing the procedure at RHCJC in the event of a violation).
437. JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 49–56
(1985) (discussing how offenders are likely more impulsive, failing to take into account
future consequences).
438. See id.
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program, Hawken’s studies show that one judge consistently gave harsher
sanctions for probation violations.439 The individual who receives the
harsher sanction may blame bad luck or the judge, thus detracting from the
program’s effectiveness. While mandatory treatment may be effective, the
offender must believe that the sentence is legitimate for the treatment to
work.440
While uniformity is important in drug treatment, courts should allow for
justifications and defenses by the defendant before a sanction is imposed.
A hearing determining the nature of the violation and the appropriate
sanction within the predetermined range should be held.441 A judge should
be required to explain why she is choosing one end of the predetermined
range over the other.442 This would help defendants not blame their
sanction on a judge’s supposed biases.
Finally, variation across judges and among offenders may lead to due
process concerns. One criticism of drug courts has been that judges become
too invested in the proceedings.443 Instead of maintaining the traditional
neutral role of decision maker, a drug court judge is intimately involved
with the offenders, particularly in a community court model.444 Without
uniform sanctions, the judge’s potential biases could affect one addict’s
sentence and future. Therefore, a consistent and predictable set of sanctions
may prevent the risk of due process violations.
3. Focus on Treatment, Not Criminal Sanctions
The Supreme Court in Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas raised
an important question: Is addiction something that should ever be
criminally punished?445 Drug courts have struggled with this question as
well, wondering which punishments are effective for drug-addicted
defendants.446 HOPE, for example, admittedly focuses solely on probation
as part of the program and only turns to treatment in the most serious of
circumstances.447 This question becomes exceedingly difficult—and
439. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 43.
440. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 7–9.
441. See supra notes 422–34 and accompanying text. There are different reasons for
which a person may incur a violation, which is why a hearing in front of a judge is
necessary. For example, one person could have missed a drug test because they were using
drugs, while another could have missed a drug test because of a family- or job-related
reason. The sanctions for these two groups of people should not be the same.
442. These hearings may also lead to issues regarding judicial discretion in imposing
sanctions. However, it is necessary that there be leeway between defendants in different
circumstances. One solution may be to have detailed guidelines drafted at the inception of a
drug court that clearly lay out when and how a defendant should be sanctioned.
443. See Trent Oram & Kara Gleckler, An Analysis of the Constitutional Issues
Implicated in Drug Courts, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 471, 528 (2006) (discussing the drug court
judge as “an active team-member,” quite different from a judge in her traditional role as a
neutral party).
444. See id.; see also Calabrese, supra note 186.
445. See supra notes 58–81 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 82–106 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 146–60 and accompanying text.
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important—when considering the number of people who are under the
influence of drugs when committing a crime.448 When formulating drug
court policy, it is important to consider where to draw the line between
addiction and mal-intentioned crime.
Some suggest that the solution is to eliminate criminal sanctions from
drug treatment completely.449 This suggestion should not be swept away.
Designing a program where the sole focus is deterring others or punishing
drug-related crimes fails to acknowledge addiction as a disease. Treatment
programs should give addicts a set of tools to use in their recovery. Using
solely deterrence theory by way of criminal sentencing in drug courts will
not treat addiction; it will only perpetuate the consequences to addicts of
continuing without such tools.
B. Quantitative and Qualitative Studies:
How to Measure Drug Courts’ Success
Most studies regarding the success of alternative drug courts have been
measured quantitatively. The reason for this is that measuring recidivism
and graduation rates is relatively easy.450 Statistics can be used as a proxy
for determining whether addicts have overcome their addiction without
spending time and money prying into their lives post-release. However, to
be in recovery451 does not mean that one is cured, and the effects of drug
treatment programs cannot be measured simply by checking a “yes” or
“no.” Instead, other factors, including long-term progress, must be taken
into account. These factors may include whether the individual has
reconnected ties with the community, whether she has successfully
maintained a job, and whether she has continued with a twelve-step
program.452
Additionally, reoffending is not necessarily a sign that an addict has
“failed” a treatment program.453 Recovery is ongoing and cannot only be
measured by graduation from a court-mandated treatment program or
448. One statistic finds that 80 percent of adults incarcerated for felonies (i) were regular
alcohol or drug abusers, (ii) had been convicted of an alcohol- or drug-related violation, (iii)
were under the influence of alcohol or drugs during the commission of the crime, or (iv) or
committed the crime to support a drug habit. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 152, at 720.
449. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. Some believe that rehabilitation as a
sentencing theory should be eliminated completely. According to Judge Morris Hoffman,
“The scandal of America’s drug courts is that we have rushed headlong into them—driven
by politics, judicial pop-psychopharmacology, fuzzy-headed notions about ‘restorative
justice’ and ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’ . . . .” Andrew Fulkerson, How Much Process Is Due
in the Drug Court, 48 CRIM. LAW BULL. 653, 660 (2012).
450. See supra notes 299–303 and accompanying text.
451. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (defining recovery).
452. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 48, at 291 (citation omitted) (“A parolee, for example,
who relapses and is arrested for possession of heroin would be classified as a recidivist when
he returns to jail. To the drug counselor, however, if the addict commits no other crime but
to be in possession of heroin and has demonstrated progress in other life areas during an
extended period of sobriety, the ‘offense’ is consistent with the dictates of the disease, which
by nature involves relapse.”).
453. For working definitions of addiction and recovery, see supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
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abstaining from crime. During recovery, a participant may relapse, but this
does not erase the work she has done up until that point. If this person is
arrested because of her drug use, then she will be counted as a “failure”—as
someone who contributed to the recidivism rate. However, in reality, the
person may not have been arrested because of a failure of the program or a
policy therein, but instead because of the ongoing nature of recovery.
Quantitative studies that measure recidivism and graduation rates do not
take these circumstances into account.454 With these studies, the metric of
success is for a short, finite period.455 Without having more in-depth and
long-term studies, it is impossible truly to know which policies successfully
treat addicts and which conflict with rehabilitative ideals.
One low-cost solution would be to have a series of questionnaires sent to
all participants—both those that graduated and those who were terminated.
Programs could administer these questionnaires when each individual
leaves the program and then again at yearly intervals.456 To encourage
completion, the questionnaires should be simple and evaluate three things.
First, they should measure participants’ perception of certain aspects of
their treatment. This section would include questions regarding procedural
justice, the atmosphere in the courtroom, the parameters of their treatment,
and whether the defendants perceived the sentence and sanction to be
appropriate. It should also include a section asking participants to articulate
the aspects of the treatment program they found to be most effective.
Second, the questionnaires should inquire into past participants’ current
lives, including relationships with family and friends, employment, and
whether they have meaningfully reintegrated into society.457 Finally, the
questionnaires could address the status of the individual’s recovery and
whether they have maintained sobriety, relapsed, or reoffended.
In deterrence-based probation programs such as HOPE, there may be an
issue with participants circumventing the system. A probationer may
discover a way to change her behavior for a short length of time, just long
enough to fulfill the probation requirements.458 For example, HOPE is
considered a successful solution to probation violations because it shows a
454. See Thompson, supra note 159, at 98 (“Success will need to be measured from a
number of different, and perhaps competing, vantage points.”).
455. For example, many studies stop after probation ends or are only able to measure one
or two years past the graduation date for cost reasons. Hawken and Kleiman’s study on
HOPE, for example, only followed up with probationers for a year after their probation
terminated. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 48–49.
456. While sobriety is lifelong, the questionnaires could not realistically be distributed
every year for the rest of an addict’s life. Therefore, a period of five years may accomplish
the goal without being overly burdensome. These questionnaires may also raise an issue of
selection bias where the only individuals to complete them would be the ones most receptive
to the program. One solution may be to have the completion of the questionnaires—at least
for a time—be a term of inactive probation after individuals have left the program.
457. This section of the questionnaire could be modeled after that used in the Arkansas
study, discussed supra notes 415–17 and accompanying text.
458. HOPE requires that probationers continuously pass drug tests and attend
appointments with their probation officers. It does not provide drug treatment unless the
probationer continuously violates the terms of his probation. See supra Part II.C.
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significant decrease in positive drug tests throughout the course of
probation.459 However, because HOPE does not incorporate twelve-step
programs or teach offenders how to maintain their sobriety beyond the
realm of probation, probationers may reoffend or continue using as soon as
they are no longer under the purview of the criminal justice system. While
probationers may view the continued threat of sanctions as a deterrent to
relapsing during the program, once the threat of sanctions is removed, it is
unclear how many will return to using drugs, regardless of whether they
reoffend.460 Therefore, swift sanction programs provide no evidence of
how effective HOPE is at treating addicts, only evidence on how effective it
is in promoting compliance with the terms of probation.461
To determine whether the programs are truly working, researchers must
perform qualitative and long-term studies, tracking offenders’ progress far
beyond the program’s completion. Requiring questionnaires after the end
of probation would easily measure the quality of the drug treatment on
offenders’ lives without incurring significant costs. These would alert
courts to policies that may or may not be effective in rehabilitating drugaddicted defendants.
CONCLUSION
Courts and legislatures have consistently struggled with the sentencing
and treatment of drug-addicted defendants. In an attempt to solve this
problem, several jurisdictions have created alternative drug courts with
varying policies that are geared toward lowering crime rates while
providing meaningful treatment to addicts. These include community
courts, such as the Red Hook Community Justice Center, courts using
community volunteers to help determine and administer a treatment plan,
such as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court, and swift sanction
probation programs, such as Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with
Enforcement. These programs have seen success in terms of quantitative
measures, but their qualitative long-term success for addicts is yet to be
determined.
When treating drug-addicted offenders, the solution can never be to place
a Band-Aid on a bullet hole. Because addiction is a lifelong struggle, the
solution must be one that provides offenders with the tools to continue to
459. See supra notes 362–66 and accompanying text.
460. Some probationers acknowledge the strength of the deterrent factors during
participation in HOPE. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 38 (“Some
probationers, when told by their probation officers that their testing frequency is being
stepped down as a reward request that it not be stepped down, because they fear that lessfrequent testing will increase their risk of going back to drug use.”).
461. Even proponents of the HOPE model acknowledge that the persistence of the
“HOPE-effect” has not been studied. See Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 259, at 50. The
report notes that one limitation of the study was that probationers were only examined while
participating in the program, and therefore Hawken and Kleiman could not conclude
“whether the effects of HOPE (e.g., reduced drug use and new arrests) continue after
probationers complete their probation terms under HOPE.” Id. Hawken and Kleiman
acknowledged the importance of this outstanding question. See id.
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live a drug-free life beyond the purview of the court system. If the goal is
truly rehabilitation, the only way to accomplish it is to ensure that the
underlying reason for which an individual is committing crimes—
addiction—is addressed on a therapeutic and long-lasting level.

